Ukraine War Analysis-September 20, 2022

From The Institute For The Study of War:

Katherine Lawlor, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 20, 8:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian-appointed occupation officials in Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts announced on September 20 that they will hold a “referendum” on acceding to Russia, with a vote taking place from September 23-27.[1] The Kremlin will use the falsified results of these sham referenda to illegally annex all Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine and is likely to declare unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts to be part of Russia as well.

The Kremlin’s annexation plans are primarily targeting a domestic audience; Putin likely hopes to improve Russian force generation capabilities by calling on the Russian people to volunteer for a war to “defend” newly claimed Russian territory. Putin and his advisors have apparently realized that current Russian forces are insufficient to conquer Ukraine and that efforts to build large forces quickly through voluntary mobilization are culminating short of the Russian military’s force requirements. Putin is therefore likely setting legal and informational conditions to improve Russian force generation without resorting to expanded conscription by changing the balance of carrots and sticks the Kremlin has been using to spur voluntary recruitment.

Putin may believe that he can appeal to Russian ethnonationalism and the defense of purportedly “Russian peoples” and claimed Russian land to generate additional volunteer forces. He may seek to rely on enhanced rhetoric in part because the Kremlin cannot afford the service incentives, like bonuses and employment benefits, that it has already promised Russian recruits.[2] But Putin is also adding new and harsher punishments in an effort to contain the risk of the collapse of Russian military units fighting in Ukraine and draft-dodging within Russia.  The Kremlin rushed the passage of a new law through the State Duma on September 20, circumventing normal parliamentary procedures.[3] This law codifies dramatically increased penalties for desertion, refusing conscription orders, and insubordination. It also criminalizes voluntary surrender and makes surrender a crime punishable by ten years in prison. The law notably does not order full-scale mobilization or broader conscription or make any preparations for such activities.

ISW has observed no evidence that the Kremlin is imminently intending to change its conscription practices. The Kremlin’s new law is about strengthening the Kremlin’s coercive volunteerism, or what Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called “self-mobilization.”[4]

The Kremlin is taking steps to directly increase force generation through continued voluntary self-mobilization and an expansion of its legal authority to deploy Russian conscripts already with the force to fight in Ukraine.

• Putin’s illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory will broaden the domestic legal definition of “Russian” territory under Russian law, enabling the Russian military to legally and openly deploy conscripts already in the Russian military to fight in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russian leadership has already deployed undertrained conscripts to Ukraine in direct violation of Russian law and faced domestic backlash.[5] Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycle usually generates around 130,000 conscripts twice per year.[6] The next cycle runs from October 1 to December 31. Russian law generally requires that conscripts receive at least four months of training prior to deployment overseas, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly denied that conscripts will be deployed to Ukraine.[7] Annexation could provide him a legal loophole allowing for the overt deployment of conscripts to fight.
• Russian-appointed occupation officials in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts announced the formation of “volunteer” units to fight with the Russian military against Ukraine.[8] Russian forces will likely coerce or physically force at least some Ukrainian men in occupied areas to fight in these units, as they have done in the territories of the Russian proxy Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).
• The Russian State Duma separately passed new incentives for foreign nationals to fight in Russia’s military to obtain Russian citizenship and will likely increase overseas recruitment accordingly.[9] That new law, which deputies also rushed through normal procedures on September 20, allows foreign nationals to gain Russian citizenship by signing a contract and serving in the Russian military for one year. Russian law previously required three years of service to apply for citizenship.
• Putin’s appeals to nationalism may generate small increases in volunteer recruitment from within Russia and parts of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. However, forces generated from such volunteers, if they manifest, will be small and poorly trained. Most eager and able-bodied Russian men and Ukrainian collaborators have likely already volunteered in one of the earlier recruitment phases.
• Local Russian administrators will continue to attempt to form volunteer units, with decreasing effect, as ISW has previously reported and mapped.[10]
• Russian forces and the Wagner Private Military Company are also directly recruiting from Russian prisons, as ISW has previously reported.[11] These troops will be undisciplined and unlikely to meaningfully increase Russian combat power.

Putin likely hopes that increasing self-mobilization, and cracking down on unwilling Russian forces, will enable him to take the rest of Donetsk and defend Russian-occupied parts of Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts. He is mistaken. Putin has neither the time nor the resources needed to generate effective combat power. But Putin will likely wait to see if these efforts are successful before either escalating further or blaming his loss on a scapegoat. His most likely scapegoat is Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Russian Ministry of Defense.  Reports that Shoigu would accompany Putin while Putin gave a speech announced and then postponed on September 20 suggest that Putin intended to make Shoigu the face of the current effort.[12]

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely also intends to deter Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensives by annexing occupied Ukrainian territory and framing Ukrainian attempts to liberate occupied territory as attacks on Russia. Russian officials and propagandists such as Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev issued vague warnings on September 20 that “the infringement of Russian territory is a crime; committing this crime permits using all means of self-defense.”[13] Russian officials are demonstrably panicked over Ukrainian advances, as ISW assessed on September 19.[14] The Kremlin likely intends these vague warnings to exacerbate Ukrainian and global fears of nuclear escalation. However, Putin has already declined to enforce any territory-specific redlines in response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian-annexed Crimea, occupied territory he has controlled for eight years and declares to be Russian.

Ukrainian and Western leaders responded to reports of the impending referenda with renewed declarations of commitment to restoring Ukrainian sovereignty over occupied Ukrainian territory.  Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on September 20 that “sham ‘referendums’ will not change anything … Ukraine has every right to liberate its territories and will keep liberating them whatever Russia has to say.”[15] NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on September 20 that “[sham referendums] will only further worsen the situation, and therefore we need to provide more support to Ukraine.”[16] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on September 20 that the United States “will never recognize this territory as anything other than a part of Ukraine” and will continue to provide “historic support” to Ukraine.[17] German Chancellor Olaf Scholz emphasized on September 19 that “Ukraine has every right to defend the sovereignty and integrity of its own territory and its own democracy.”[18] French President Emmanuel Macron called the sham referenda a “parody” and a “provocation.”

Key Takeaways

• Russian-appointed occupation officials in Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts announced on September 20 that they will hold a “referendum” on acceding to Russia, with a vote taking place from September 23-27.
• The Kremlin’s annexation plans are primarily targeting a domestic audience; Putin likely intends to improve Russian force generation capabilities by calling on the Russian people to volunteer for a war ostensibly to defend newly-claimed Russian territory.
• Ukrainian forces continued disrupting ongoing Russian efforts to reestablish ground lines of communications (GLOCs) across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces are likely targeting Ukrainian hydrotechnical infrastructure in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts to threaten Ukrainian positions along the Siverskyi Donets River.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on September 20.
• Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks west of Hulyaipole on September 20 and continued routine artillery strikes throughout Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces continue to degrade their force generation capabilities by cannibalizing training elements to fight in combat formations in Ukraine.

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September 20, 2022: Ukraine launched a series of offensive operations that started on August 29th in the south. This was no surprise and Russia had moved a lot of troops from the north to block any Ukrainian attacks in Kherson province or Donbas to the east. All this turned out to be a deception and on September 6 Ukraine launched a more powerful surprise offensive in the northeast (Kharkiv province). Many Russian units panicked and fled when they realized they might be surrounded. This included units falling apart with troops abandoning tanks and other major items of equipment. By the 11th Russia announced it was withdrawing from Kharkiv province. The withdrawal was already in progress when Russia made it official. The offensive spread to Donbas, causing a retreat from several towns that had come under Russian control in 2014. The offensive kept going in Kharkiv province with Ukrainian troops reaching the Russian border in many places. Meanwhile the southern (Kherson province) offensive began on August 29th as a distraction, then expanded as Russian units panicked when they realized that Ukrainian HIMARS vehicles carrying GMLRS guided missiles were destroying the remaining bridges on the Dnieper River and trapping thousands of Russian troops. The Ukrainian missiles also hit Russian supply storage sites leaving the trapped troops without ammunition, fuel and other supplies.

Ukrainian forces are now attacking on a broad front and expect to control all of Kherson province by the end of the year. This means major losses for the Russian in terms of troops captured or driven out of the area. In addition, Ukraine will control most of the water supply for the Crimean Peninsula and control territory close enough to the Kerch Strait bridge to damage or destroy it with missiles or airstrikes. The Kerch Strait bridge was completed in 2014 at a cost of nearly four billion dollars. It is the main supply route between Russia and Crimea. The only other rail line runs from Donbas to Crimea and is under attack by Ukrainian partisans.

Russia troop losses are another problem. Russia is unable to recruit enough troops to replace losses and a recent leaked report from the Russian Ministry of Finance completed in late August gave the Russian army’s “special military operations” in Ukraine some death toll numbers. According to this report, the Russian government needs to allocate 361 billion rubles for the pensions of the fallen Russian troops, an average of about 7 million rubles per person, and a total of 48,759 dead. Ukrainian military intel currently puts the Russian dead at about 54,000, a number many Westerners dismiss as inflated. Another Russian weakness that is largely ignored by Western media is the degree of corruption in the Russian military. This has led to chronic shortages of essential supplies and equipment for the troops. This was particularly the case with thousands of Russian “reserve” troops recruited and financed by individual provinces. The central government ordered this mobilization but many provinces were unable to comply. Those that did sent volunteers who were too old or out of shape for military service. These men were attracted by the high bonuses and monthly pay promised. Those that survived their two months in Ukraine found that the money has not been deposited in their bank accounts as promised. Conscripts are banned by law from serving combat outside Russia. Conscripts have also learned to avoid the deceptive offers to become a better paid contract soldier because it would make them eligible for service in Ukraine. All this means Russia cannot obtain enough new troops to replace heavy losses in Ukraine. Ukrainian and NATO electronic monitoring of Russian communications confirms that replacements are lacking for troops lost (killed, wounded or captured) in combat. Russian commanders are also concerned about their supply situation. They are not receiving enough ammunition, especially artillery shells and rockets. Food, clothing and medical supplies are inadequate, especially now that winter is coming and most of the troops will be at the front, not in barracks or other housing. Hunger, cold and a lack of fire (artillery) support makes troops more willing to desert or surrender at the first opportunity.

Ukrainian troops have none of these problems, save for artillery, and that is a major reason for recent successes in combat. Ukraine always had more troops in Ukraine than Russia but over the last few months more of them have received combat training and are led by officers and NCOs that are far more competent than their Russian counterparts. The Russians still cling to the Soviet-era centralized command system and lack of NCOs. For over a decade Ukrainian troop have been adopting Western methods, which means more NCOs and units giver “mission orders” that include permission to improvise. The Ukrainians are demonstrating the superiority of this approach against an opponent using centralized command. This is disastrous for the Russians who don’t have enough troops to cover the long front lines in southern (Kherson province) and Donbas. If the Russians are driven out of all Ukraine except Crimea, there is a tiny front line (a narrow bit of land connecting Ukraine with the Crimean Peninsula. Normally that would be an advantage, but with the Ukrainians that close the GMLRS guided missiles used by HIMARS vehicles can hit just about anything in Crimea because GMLRS has a range of 80 kilometers. The U.S. has finally agreed to supply Ukraine with the larger (300-kilometer range) ATACMs missile that HIMARS vehicles can also use. One 610mm ATACMS missile or six 226mm rockets can be carried and launched by a HIMARS vehicle. The 226mm rockets are heavily used in Ukraine and production has been increased to deal with that. There are several thousand ATACMs missiles available and in 2024 ATACMS will be replaced by the smaller PrSM (Precision Strike Missile), so that HIMARS can carry and launch two of them. PrSM has a range of 500 kilometers. Production of PrSM began this year but the missile won’t officially enter service until 2024.

The American decision to send ATACMS was recently suspended because of Russian threats to use nuclear weapons. This threat caused some senior American officials to urge caution. Ukrainians responded by pointing out the growing criticism of Putin within Russia and ultra-nationalists often agreeing with that. Many ultra-nationalists insist that victory could be achieved simply by ordering a total mobilization. This ignores the fact that ever since the Soviet Union collapsed Russians have been very vocal in their opposition to conscription, which is the primary means for carrying out a mass mobilization. The government-controlled media does not discuss Russian defeats in Ukraine but at the local level most Russians know of a local family that had a son killed or badly wounded in Ukraine. That has not triggered calls for mass mobilization because it is obvious that Russia is not threatened and is the aggressor in Ukraine. Russians also know that the international reaction to the attack on Ukraine has meant economic problems for the average Russian because of growing inflation, product shortages and unemployment. Many American decision makers are either ignorant of this reality or choose to ignore it. This helps Putin while complicating Ukrainian efforts to drive the Russians out and end the war.

Russian media and government officials are having a hard time explaining the recent Russian defeats in Ukraine. The media also consists of pro-war Russian commentators who communicate via encrypted messages on Telegram, a popular cell phone app in Russia and Ukraine. Early on many of these Russian Telegram based military blogers (“mil-blogers” supported the invasion and were supplied with information by the Russian government, including opportunities to spend some time with the troops inside Ukraine. By June the Russian mil-blogers were no longer reporting the official Russian version of events in Ukraine, but what was being reported by Russian veterans of the fighting in Ukraine. Recently that included numerous reports of the disastrous Russian defeats in Ukraine. More Russians are openly demanding to know who was responsible these massive defeats. This puts the government in a difficult position because leader Vladimir Putin cannot be blamed, at least not openly or officially. Instead, more senior officers (generals) in charge of troops in Ukraine are blamed, as well as the Minister of Defense. All of these officials work for and often report directly to Putin. This is no secret and the most recent disasters in Ukraine have generated more speculation on how much longer Putin can cling to power. Openly criticizing Putin often leads to an untimely death either because of an accident or sudden illness. What Putin and his critics can agree on is the best strategy in Ukraine is to concentrate attacks on industry, transportation and civilian infrastructure in general. Railroads and buildings can’t shoot back.

Putin is also under pressure from the ultra-nationalists to order a full mobilization and the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Putin had also threatened to use nukes after the first Russian defeat when Russian troops took heavy losses and were forced to withdraw from northern Ukraine and the capital Kyiv. Putin was told by his own nuclear weapons experts that the use of nukes in Ukraine would be the first such use since World War II, when only the Americans had these weapons. Now several NATO nations have nukes, as does unstable Russian neighbor North Korea. Using nukes against Ukraine risked nuclear retaliation by NATO nations, including the United States. Russia would become a pariah state for having been the first to use nukes. Russian diplomats confirmed that. Nukes were removed from the options list. That left full mobilization, which Putin’s political and military advisors feared would create a popular backlash. After months of extreme economic sanctions, many Russians are angry about rising prices and less, or no, income because the sanctions have shut down a lot of Russian companies. Going to war with the rest of Europe is not seen as a viable solution. There is growing anger among Russians towards Putin, who has been the undisputed Russian leader for two decades. That anger has turned into more public criticism, despite the physical threats to such critics. When you have so many critics that threats and physical intimidation no longer work, it’s time to reconsider the Ukrainian situation. Putin critics call for just getting out of Ukraine and making peace with NATO. Putin sees this as leading a new Russian government without Putin. The Russians are not only losing in Ukraine, they are also losing in Russia.

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Russian annexation votes are of course without the least real world significance long term without the military force to back them up.  Putin seems to have entered a world of unreality with completely fraudulent plebiscites substituting for military power.