Ukrainian War Analysis-March 26, 2022

From The institute For the Study of War:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 26

Fredrick W. Kagan and George Barros

March 26, 1500 ET

Russian forces continued their unsuccessful efforts to move into positions from which to attack or encircle Kyiv, claims by First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Sergei Rudskoi on March 25 notwithstanding. The Russian military continues to concentrate replacements and reinforcements in Belarus and Russia north of Kyiv, to fight for positions on Kyiv’s outskirts, and to attempt to complete the encirclement and reduction of Chernihiv.  Russian activities around Kyiv show no change in the Russian high command’s prioritization of the fight around Ukraine’s capital, which continues to occupy the largest single concentration of Russian ground forces in Ukraine.  The Russians have not claimed to redeploy forces from Kyiv or any other part of Ukraine to concentrate on fighting in Donbas, and we have observed numerous indicators that they have not done so.  The increasingly static nature of the fighting around Kyiv reflects the incapacity of Russian forces rather than any shift in Russian objectives or efforts at this time.

Russian forces will likely bisect the city of Mariupol in the coming days as they claim and will likely gain control of the city in the relatively near future.  Fighting in Mariupol continues to be fierce, however, and Russian forces continue to suffer significant losses.  The amount of combat power the Russians will be able to harvest from Mariupol once they gain control of the city will determine whether the city’s fall will allow the Russians to launch renewed large-scale offensive operations in Ukraine’s east.  It remains unclear how badly damaged Russian units fighting for Mariupol are—or how much more damage they will incur in completing the capture of the city—but high-profile casualties in elite and conventional Russian combat units such as the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, both of which have lost commanders in the past few weeks, suggest that losses in such units are high.[1]

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct limited counter-attacks across the theater, most recently near Kharkiv.  Ukrainian counter-attacks have been prudent and effective, allowing Ukrainian forces to regain small areas of tactically or operationally significant terrain without over-extending themselves. 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure positions from which to attack and seize Kyiv despite the supposed reframing of the Russian military’s priorities by First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Sergei Rudskoi on March 25.
• The Russians will likely make important progress in seizing the city of Mariupol in the coming days and will probably take the city in the near future.  The scale of Russian losses in the fight for Mariupol will determine whether the city’s fall will permit Russia to renew large-scale combat operations in eastern Ukraine.  It is too soon to tell, but current indicators suggest that Russian losses have been and will continue to be high.
• The Ukrainian General Staff continues to report on challenges Russia faces in finding both troops and equipment to continue the war.  The General Staff reports generally match observed patterns and indicators within the Ukrainian battlespace and are likely largely accurate, although we have little independent verification of their details.
• The captured city of Kherson appears to be resisting Russian control in ways that are driving the Russian military and national guard to concentrate forces on securing it.  The requirement to secure captured cities can impose a significant cost on over-stretched Russian forces and hinder their ability to conduct offensive operations.

The Ukrainian General Staff reports that the Russian military is continuing efforts to replace personnel and equipment losses but struggling to do so.  The General Staff claimed on March 25 that Russia has established a base in Russia’s Bryansk Oblast to repair and rehabilitate equipment pulled from strategic reserves.[2]  The General Staff asserted that much of Russia’s reserve equipment is unusable or in very poor states of repair, with essential gear—including engines—stripped out of many vehicles.  The General Staff added on March 26 that the Russians are attempting to refurbish old T-72 tanks as part of this effort.[3]  The General Staff also claimed that the Russian military is lowering its standards for conscripts and recruits and has been forced to use a higher proportion of conscripts in combat as it has suffered losses among its professional soldiers.[4]  We have no independent confirmation of these reports, but they are consistent with observed patterns of Russian operations and losses in Ukraine and with ISW’s earlier assessment of the state of the Russian personnel reserve system.[5]

Morale problems within the Russian military are becoming more serious and apparent.  Reports that the soldiers of a Russian unit killed their brigade commander by running him over with a tank and, more recently, that the commander of the 13th Guards Tank Regiment of the 4th Guards Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army) committed suicide likely indicate a general breakdown of morale even among first tier Russian combat units.[6]

The Russians continue to try to concentrate forces for renewed fighting around Kyiv, however.  The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 26 that additional Russian forces from the Eastern Military District were being sent into Ukraine at an unspecified location.[7]  Eastern Military District forces have been engaged exclusively in the Kyiv and Chernihiv region.

Go here to read the rest.  The war is now entering its thirty-first day.  Unless Putin is able to put the entire economy of Russia onto a war footing, something I do not think he can do, I doubt he has much more than a month to end the war victoriously.  Reports are circulating that Putin is predicting the War will be over by May 9, the Victory Day holiday observed in the old Soviet Union.  If this is accurate, Putin realizes he is working against a clock.  I could imagine him declaring victory and pulling back to the two puppet states he has created in eastern Ukraine.  I suspect that he would then find that wars are much easier to start than they are to stop.