From The Institute for the Study of War:
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2024
Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 25, 2024, 8:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on April 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces are stabilizing their small salient northwest of Avdiivka and may make further tactical gains that could cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw from other tactical positions along the frontline west of Avdiivka to a more defensible line. Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced into central Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka) from Novobakhmutivka after likely seizing all of Novobakhmutivka on the night of April 24 to 25.[1] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized all of Solovyove on April 25 and advanced up to two kilometers in depth in eastern Novokalynove (northwest of Avdiivka) on the night of April 24 to 25.[2] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and the Arbat Spetsnaz Battalion made the advances in Novobakhmutivka and Solovyove.[3] Russian forces have committed roughly a reinforced division’s worth of combat power (comprised mainly of four CMD brigades) to the frontline northwest of Avdiivka and appear to be attempting to widen their penetration of the Ukrainian defense in the area following significant advances into Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) as of April 18.[4] These recent Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka have been relatively quick but still relatively marginal, with Russian forces advancing at most roughly five kilometers in depth since April 18. Russian forces continue offensive operations throughout the frontline west of Avdiivka but have so far only achieved gradual marginal gains west and southwest of Avdiivka.[5]
The recent Russian advances in Novobakhmutivka and Solovyove widen the salient Russian forces are advancing along northwest of Avdiivka and afford Russian forces a more stable position from which to pursue a wider penetration. This salient is roughly two kilometers in width at its widest section, however, and would still be vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks should Ukrainian forces stabilize the tactical situation in the area. Ocheretyne notably sits on a junction between the Ukrainian defensive line that Russian forces have been attacking since their seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024 and a subsequent defensive line further west, which Russian sources have identified as a more heavily fortified line.[6] Russian forces could further stabilize their salient northwest of Avdiivka and advance further west of Ocheretyne, making positions along the Berdychi-Semenivka-Umanske line increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces to hold. The Ukrainian command could decide to withdraw Ukrainian forces further west if it deems Russian tactical gains in the area to be too threatening to current Ukrainian positions. Ukrainian forces withdrew from Avdiivka to relatively poorly prepared defensive positions immediately west of Avdiivka following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February and proceeded to slow Russian advances.[7] Positions further west would likely afford Ukrainian forces similar or better opportunities to blunt Russian advances, and Russian forces would likely have to maintain a relatively high tempo of offensive operations to place these subsequent Ukrainian defensive positions under immediate pressure. Russian forces will likely have to replenish and reinforce attacking units northwest of Avdiivka and will likely not be able to maintain the tempo of offensive operations required to rapidly advance west of the Berdychi-Semenivka-Umanske line. Russian forces will likely continue to make tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka, but these gains are unlikely to develop into an operationally significant penetration, let alone cause the collapse of the Ukrainian defense west of Avdiivka.
Russian offensive operations west of Avdiivka aim to exploit opportunities for tactical gains while the Russian offensive operation to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances. Russian forces in the Avdiivka area remain roughly 30 kilometers from their reported operational objective of Pokrovsk and roughly 17 kilometers from relatively large villages east of Pokrovsk.[8] Even if Russian tactical gains do cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw to positions further west, the current Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka are unlikely to become operationally significant advances in the near term. Russian pressure on Chasiv Yar is more significant. Russian forces currently on the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar have been intensifying efforts to seize the city since March 2024.[9] The offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances as the seizure of the town would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against cities that form a significant Ukrainian defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.[10] Russian forces do pose a credible threat of seizing Chasiv Yar, although they may not be able to do so rapidly.[11] Russian forces are likely attempting to seize as much territory as possible before the arrival of US security assistance significantly improves Ukrainian defensive capabilities in the coming weeks, and the Russian military command may be intensifying offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka because the area provides greater opportunities for making more rapid tactical gains despite the relative operational insignificance of those gains.
US officials are reportedly worried that the latest package of US military aid to Ukraine may not be enough for Ukraine to regain all of its territory. US military assistance is only part of what Ukraine currently needs, moreover; but Ukraine is itself working to address other war fighting requirements — primarily manpower challenges and the expansion of its defense industrial base (DIB). Politico reported on April 25 that three US officials believe that the recent provision of US aid may not be enough for Ukraine to restore its territorial integrity due to changes in the situation on the battlefield in the past few months.[12] One US official reportedly stated that the “immediate goal” of the US aid package is to stop Ukrainian losses and help Ukraine “regain momentum” on the battlefield, after which the goal will be to help Ukraine regain its territory. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on April 24 that it is “certainly possible” that Russian forces could make further tactical advances in the coming weeks but that the US will be able to provide Ukraine “with what it needs through 2024.”[13] The commander of the Ukrainian 93rd Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Pavlo Palisa, stated on April 25, however, that Ukraine’s manpower problems are “much more important than ammunition.”[14] Palisa stated that one Ukrainian soldier is currently having to perform the tasks of three to four soldiers and that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces by about five to seven times in the Bakhmut direction. Palisa stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of this numerical superiority by conducting attacks that result in personnel and equipment losses, which Ukrainian forces cannot afford to do.
ISW previously assessed that Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian offensive operations and eventually challenge the theater-wide initiative heavily depends on both the US provision of military aid and on Ukraine’s efforts to restore and reconstitute existing units and create new ones.[15] US military assistance is currently en route to Ukraine, and Ukraine has recently taken steps to address its manpower issues.[16] Ukraine is also dramatically expanding its defense industrial capacity to develop the ability over time to satisfy its military requirements with significantly reduced foreign military assistance.[17] Russian forces are likely trying to take advantage of the limited period of time before US aid appears on the battlefield by intensifying offensive operations on certain sectors of the front in order to make tactical gains in the coming weeks.[18] Russian forces are unlikely, however, to translate these tactical advances into operationally significant gains before this window closes.[19] The timeline for Ukraine’s resolution of its manpower challenges is less clear. Ukraine has recently taken steps to increase significantly the pool of manpower conscripted into the army and will need time to induct and train new conscripts. The Ukrainian command has been taking steps to get more manpower to front line units already on a limited scale, as ISW has previously reported.[20] The arrival of new ammunition and equipment will likely help blunt ongoing Russian offensives, but the timeline for the incorporation of new manpower will likely play a larger role in determining the timeline for future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
Russian forces are reportedly fielding drones adapted to be more resilient against Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on critical sectors of the frontline, likely in an attempt to leverage new technological capabilities to exploit a limited window before US security assistance arrives in Ukraine. Ukrainska Pravda reported on April 15 that its sources in the Ukrainian General Staff stated that the number of Russian drones in “hot” sectors of the frontline has “at least doubled” in the past three months.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff sources reported that Russian forces are using modernized drones that operate on frequencies between 700 to 1,000 MHz, which are difficult for Ukrainian EW to jam because Ukrainian EW systems are chiefly designed to jam Russian drones operating on frequencies around 900 MHz. The sources stated that Ukraine is developing a unified system to collect information about Russian drone adaptations in order to quickly adapt Ukrainian electronic warfare systems to counter the Russian drones. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are attempting to adapt their drone technology and tactics along the frontline as part of an offense-defense arms race to mitigate Ukrainian technological adaptations designed to offset Russian material advantages.[22] The Russian military likely chose to deploy drones operating on a frequency more difficult for Ukrainian EW to jam to support continued ground operations in critical sectors of the frontline to further exploit Ukrainian materiel shortages. The Russian military may have assessed that Ukrainian forces would eventually adapt their EW systems to jam drones at a larger frequency range and employed them now to support ongoing offensive operations as Ukrainian forces wait for US security assistance to arrive. The pattern of one side seizing on a fleeting technological advantage to support immediate ground operations while it lasts will likely become a characteristic of this kind of conflict.
A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a “media school” in the Balkans, likely supporting Kremlin efforts to expand its reach in the international information space. The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on April 25 that it opened the “Rybar Media School” in the Balkans and that a Rybar team spent the past week in Serbia and the territory of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina).[23] Rybar claimed that its team taught students, journalists, politicians, and academics how to create and run Telegram channels, organize these channels into networks, distribute “correct” content, and fight “misinformation.” Rybar claimed that founder Mikhail Zvinchuk gave lectures, adopted 10 “bright and promising” projects, and reached agreements to hold regular in-person masterclasses with authors of unspecified Russian Telegram channels. Rybar previously gave a masterclass on the importance of Telegram and other social media to press heads and communications personnel at Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec likely in an effort to normalize the war without involving the Kremlin.[24] Rybar’s public expansion to international media influence operations is notable, particularly as the Kremlin seeks to expand its influence over the Russian information space and coopt more Russian milbloggers like it has with Rybar.[25] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev met with Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik in St. Petersburg on April 23 and discussed increasing interstate cooperation and the situation in the Balkans and Europe.[26]
French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the importance of Europe’s self-sufficiency for its defense and sovereignty during an April 25 speech.[27] Macron stated that Russia has “no inhibitions” and “no limits” and threatens Europe’s ability to ensure its security.[28] Macron called on Europe to build a strategic concept of “credible European defense” and develop its defense industry to build its sovereignty and autonomy.[29] Macron stated that European countries should give preference to European suppliers when buying military equipment and supported proposals for an EU loan program to finance preferential buying. Macron also supported increasing Europe’s cybersecurity and cyber defense capacities, closer defense ties with the UK, and the creation of a European academy to train high-ranking military personnel.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces are stabilizing their small salient northwest of Avdiivka and may make further tactical gains that could cause Ukrainian forces to withdraw from other tactical positions along the frontline west of Avdiivka to a more defensible line.
- Russian offensive operations west of Avdiivka aim to exploit opportunities for tactical gains while the Russian offensive operation to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances.
- US officials are reportedly worried that the latest package of US military aid to Ukraine may not be enough for Ukraine to regain all of its territory. US military assistance is only part of what Ukraine currently needs, moreover; but Ukraine is itself working to address other war fighting requirements — primarily manpower challenges and the expansion of its defense industrial base (DIB).
- Russian forces are reportedly fielding drones adapted to be more resilient against Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on critical sectors of the frontline, likely in an attempt to leverage new technological capabilities to exploit a limited window before US security assistance arrives in Ukraine.
- A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a “media school” in the Balkans, likely supporting Kremlin efforts to expand its reach in the international information space.
- French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the importance of Europe’s self-sufficiency for its defense and sovereignty during an April 25 speech.
- Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Siversk, and Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin justified Russia’s ongoing efforts to nationalize Russian enterprises, including defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises on April 25.
Go here to read the rest. So the Russians are nationalizing industries again? May they have the efficiency of the old Soviet Union. In many ways Putin’s reign is a nostalgia tour for Stalin, underlying the only true thing that Marx said:
Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.
