From The Institute For The Study of War:
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 4
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark
May 4, 7:15pm ET
Ukrainian defenses have largely stalled Russian advances in Eastern Ukraine. Russian troops conducted a number of unsuccessful attacks in Eastern Ukraine on May 4 and were unable to make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacking south of Izyum appear increasingly unlikely to successfully encircle Ukrainian forces in the Rubizhne area. Ukrainian forces have so far prevented Russian forces from merging their offensives to the southeast of Izyum and the west of Lyman, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk, as Russian forces likely intended.
Russian forces reportedly entered the Azovstal Steel Plant – rather than its outskirts – for the first time on May 4. The extent of this Russian advance remains unclear, and Russian forces likely face further costly fighting if they intend to clear the entire facility. The Kremlin likely hopes that the successful capture of Azovstal through a ground assault will cement the Kremlin’s growing effort to claim complete control of Mariupol by May 9, with Russian propagandists recently arriving in the city to set conditions for further claims of a Russian victory. The Kremlin likely intends to claim some sort of victory in Mariupol to present a success to the Russian people, though Russian forces are highly unlikely to halt offensive operations across Ukraine on this date.
Russian forces intensified airstrikes against transportation infrastructure in Western Ukraine on May 4 but remain unable to interdict Western aid shipments to Ukraine. Six Russian cruise missiles hit electrical substations near railway stations in Lviv and Transcarpathia (the southwestern Oblast of Ukraine) on May 4.[1] A senior US defense official reported that Russian aircraft conducted 200 to 300 airstrikes largely targeting transportation infrastructure in the last 24 hours.[2] The US official added that these Russian strikes are likely intended disrupt Ukrainian transportation capabilities and slow down weapon re-supply efforts but have been unable to do so.[3]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces engaged in several unsuccessful ground offensives to the south of Izyum and did not significantly advance efforts to encircle Ukrainian troops in the cauldron to the southeast of Izyum and west of the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline.
- Russian forces reportedly stormed the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 4 and are likely operating inside the plant’s facilities.
- Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that a Ukrainian counteroffensive pushed Russian troops back 40 kilometers from Kharkiv City.
- Russian forces conducted a number of unsuccessful counteroffensives on the southern axis.
Go here to read the rest. From Strategy Page:
May 4, 2022: The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 turned a local problem into a conflict with global impact. These were the result of economic disruption caused by the fighting inside Ukraine and unexpectedly severe economic sanctions imposed on Russia. Both nations were key components of the global food, energy and raw materials supply system.
In addition to the sanctions, Russia found that their armed forces were far less effective than they and other nations believed. This had different implications depending on whether you were an ally of Russia or a potential victim. The Russian military was revealed to be ridden with corruption, poor leadership and a government that underestimated how serious those known problems were. Ukraine was the first widespread and intensive heavy use of Russian weapons by Russian troops since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Many of the Ukrainian weapons were similar or even identical to those used by Russia but Ukrainians were more motivated and better prepared for combat than the Russian invaders. Another embarrassing revelation was that the Western weapons Ukrainians used heavily, especially portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems, were far more effective than the Russians expected. Russia has long been a major arms exporter and existing and potential customers are revising their purchasing plans. Nations already equipped with a lot of Russian weapons and military gear also have to revise their military plans.
Russia is also a major exporter of fuel, food and raw materials. Russia is the major supplier for some raw materials. Customers can find other suppliers but often at great expense, especially when time is a factor. European nations have become increasingly dependent on Russian oil and natural gas. The Russians assured skeptical European customers that it was in everyone’s interest to honor these energy export deals because Russia had become dependent on tech, manufactured goods and specialized services supplied by their European energy and raw materials customers. The extent of the economic sanctions imposed by the West in response to the Ukraine invasion came as a surprise to Russia. As did the realization that their former European customers could afford to pay the high cost of switching suppliers. The smaller and weaker Russian economy was unable to shield the average Russian from the sanctions economic impact. The Russian government tried to shift the blame to the unreliable foreigners. That excuse was showing its age and more Russians are inclined to blame their own government, the same government that eventually outlawed any public expressions of doubt in the capabilities of government officials.
Foreign trade accounts for about 28 percent of Russian GDP and about half of it has been disrupted by the 2022 sanctions. China is Russia’s largest trading partner and, together with Belarus and a few other nations, continues to trade with Russia. The other half is currently halted by the sanctions with major problems for the Russian economy. The disrupted exports are a more manageable problem for the trading partners involved, which are mainly industrialized nations in the West.
All this degrades future Russian economic prospects. That has a negative impact on Russian allies. These foreign supporters now see their powerful patron as less powerful than believed and now feel desperate or simply afraid. And then there is China, which does not have allies, only trading partners and tribute states. Russia is now moving from trading partner to the lower tribute state status.
Go here to read the rest. I assume that Russian generals are under pressure from Putin to make progress prior to May 9. If this is the best they can do, they are merely prolonging the agony of a lost war.
I appreciate the daily updates on the War in Ukraine here at TAC: it is hard to sort through various sources to find out what’s really happening. Western media usually parrots each other. The ISW is the best of these having many ex-UK and US military analysts.
I want to suggest to those interested the YouTube blog by an on-site Ukrainian commercial airlines pilot, Denys Davidov: I have found his almost daily updates from Ukraine very on target, way ahead of Western news media.
Yesterday 5/4 he posted “Why Ruzzia (sic) has failed in Odessa and Mykolaiv.” It is a very informative explanation of the geography between Kherson and Odessa, and why Ukraine is actually concentrating its forces to retake Kherson and protect vitally important Odessa. The coastal geography between Odessa and Kherson is not directly passable, and one must use instead the Ukrainian highway traveling up to Voznesensk in a giant inverted “V”, and then travel south to Odessa— Because the coast in this area is cut by several deep inlets and large rivers. Just one leg of the “V” is about 80 km, and he says much of the way intersects with various Ukrainian cities, where armor is highly vulnerable to attack in urban environments. There is actually one coastal highway that is more direct, from Mykolaiv to Odessa, but there is one bridge across a large river which the Ukrainians would probably instantly bomb and trap the Russians’ column. Given the Russians‘ glacial pace, it’s really doubtful they can win this war.
Davidov obviously as pro Ukrainian, since he was driven from his home in Kyiv at the beginning of the onslaught, but he generally admits when the Russians have made gains such as he says right now in a drive southward they have launched near Izium. Once again, however, they appear to be bogged down,
I have little respect for the undisciplined deliberate barbarism of the Russian military.
The Ukrainian in-laws of a close friend sent me a 60-second video clip about 4 weeks ago from the early days of the invasion ca. 2/25/22 in a suburb outside Kyiv where they live: They were filming a Russian BMT armor vehicle coming down an expressway, when it deliberately if yours off course to crush Ukrainian civilian in his Yugo-like car—-No provocation, no threat, just wanton murder. Everyone in the apartments viewing this gasp in disbelief. I have suggested he have them share it with the nearest Ukrainian embassy: clear evidence of war crime, and they may be able to identify the commander and vehicle driver from serial numbers.
(If Don M wants, I can email him the clip to his blog email—I have it in my cell phone video library, but haven’t figured out how to download it to TAC. It is quite unbelievable—til you see it.)
I want to see how the “Mother Russia” Putin defenders explain away this.
Russia had silenced or ignored the few classical economists in the country and hence, unable to plan for the economic cost of war and sanctions. Putin is at once, ignorant and unbalanced; a deadly combination to himself and others.