From The Institute For The Study of War:
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 15, 2023
Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark
August 15, 2023, 5:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12pm ET on August 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 15 and reportedly advanced in Luhansk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[1] Coordinates published by a Russian milblogger on August 15 indicate that Ukrainian forces have advanced south of Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[2] Geolocated footage posted on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced into Robotyne, and further Russian and Ukrainian reporting published on August 15 suggests that Ukrainian forces have committed additional counteroffensive brigades to the western Zaporizhia oblast area.[3] Ukrainian Colonel Petro Chernyk stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is advancing slowly in southern Ukraine because Ukrainian forces must overcome a three-echeloned Russian defensive line.[4] Chernyk stated that the Russian line of defense includes a first line of minefields stretching several kilometers wide; a second line with artillery, equipment, and personnel concentrations; and a third line of rear positions meant to preserve resources.[5] Chernyk noted that Ukrainian counterbattery measures are especially important in order to prevent Russian artillery from targeting Ukrainian mine-clearing equipment.[6] Chernyk’s statements are in line with ISW’s previous assessments that Russia’s doctrinally sound elastic defense is slowing Ukrainian forces’ advances in southern Ukraine.[7]
Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike against targets mainly in Ukrainian rear areas on the night of August 14-15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 28 missiles, including four Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, 20 Kh-101/555 air-based cruise missiles, and four Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, at targets throughout Ukraine on the night of August 14-15 and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 16 Kh-101/555 and Kalibr missiles.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched eight S-300/400 missiles in ground attack mode at targets in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the missile strikes targeted key enterprises in Ukraine’s defense-industrial base.[10] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian missiles targeted various rear areas of Ukraine, including industrial areas in Dnipropetrovsk, Volyn, Lviv, Cherkassy and Donetsk oblasts.[11] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck the Starokostyantyniv airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, although Ukrainian sources did not confirm this strike.[12] Russian sources may be inflating claims of the strike on Khmelnytskyi Oblast in order to frame Russia as effectively targeting Ukrainian assets associated with Ukraine’s counteroffensive capabilities.[13]
The Kremlin is using the Army-2023 forum in Moscow (August 14-20) to foster bilateral military and political relations with other states and posture itself as a reliable and technologically advanced partner. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that over 77,000 representatives from over 1,500 Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises are presenting over 28,500 defensive and technical developments at the forum, and that representatives from over 82 countries are in attendance.[14] The MoD claimed that Russia conducted 14 bilateral meetings on the first day of the forum.[15] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin met with officials from Myanmar, Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, and Djibouti to discuss bilateral defense relations.[16] The Russian MoD also posted photographs of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu viewing Iranian, Chinese, and Indian exhibitions.[17] Chinese Defense Minister Colonel General Li Shangfu spoke at the forum to celebrate Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation and to signal Chinese readiness for further cooperation.[18] The Russian MoD featured multiple Iranian drones at the forum.[19] The Russian MoD also postured itself as a viable long-term defense partner and weapons producer by hosting conversations on long term Russian military training, the intended integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into Russian weapons and control systems, the utilization of three-dimensional printing for Russian naval repairs, and the modernization of domestic rescue and underwater equipment.[20]
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian government as effectively meeting Russian force generation efforts, portraying Western and Ukrainian resources as limited, and promoting international cooperation against the West. Shoigu claimed on August 15 at the Moscow International Security Conference that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) has produced various weapons, tanks, armored vehicles, and drones in an amount of time and alleged that Russian and Soviet equipment capabilities surpass Western equipment capabilities.[21] Shoigu claimed that Western sanctions on Russia have helped to increase domestic military equipment production through import substitution at DIB enterprises, part of a longstanding (and inaccurate) Kremlin narrative since 2014 claiming that international sanctions strengthen Russia.[22] Shoigu claimed that in contrast, Ukrainian resources and Western military arsenals are almost completely depleted.[23] ISW continues to assess that Russia has failed to mobilize its DIB to adequately support the war effort, however.[24]
Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated unsubstantiated claims on August 15 at the Moscow International Security Conference that the West is responsible for “igniting the conflict” in Ukraine.[25] Shoigu and Putin reiterated rhetoric accusing the West of creating instability in Africa, Latin America, and Asia and advocated for deepening Russian defense relations with those countries and the creation of a “multipolar world order.”[26] Shoigu also alleged that the West escalated international conflicts including “the situation around Taiwan.”[27] Shoigu’s reference to Taiwan likely indicates Russia’s continued efforts to create a “no limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow despite China’s reservations.
Wagner Group-affiliated sources are undermining private military companies (PMCs) affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Several Russian and Belarusian insider sources claimed on August 15 that rumors currently circulating about the alleged transfer of Wagner commanders to the Russian MoD’s “Redut” PMC are false.”[28] The insider sources called the rumors a ”dream” of the Russian MoD and denied that any Wagner commanders are transferring to ”Redut” and are instead continuing to fulfill tasks as part of Wagner leadership.[29] Wagner affiliated sources and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin previously harshly criticized ”Redut” and its constituent units over the backdrop of Wagner’s tensions with the Russian MoD during the Battle of Bakhmut.[30] The acerbic responses of many Wagner-affiliated channels to the allegation that some Wagner commanders may be transferring to ”Redut” suggests that Wagner sources have a continued interest in undermining various MoD-associated organs. As ISW reported on August 14, the Russian MoD appears to be struggling to consolidate control of other PMCs associated with Russian businessmen and enterprises, and likely hopes to maintain a grasp on “Redut” despite rhetorical attacks by Wagner affiliated channels.[31]
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to comment on Wagner issues on the African continent to remain active in the information space, but is notably refraining from commenting on the war in Ukraine. A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel posted an audio recording of Prigozhin on August 15 wherein Prigozhin commented on the alleged arrests of protesters wearing Wagner shirts in Ghana and claimed that the incident proves that Wagner has continued support around the world and in Africa.[32] Wagner channels previously posted an audio clip of Prigozhin discussing the coup in Niger and Wagner’s presence in Africa on August 8.[33] Prigozhin appears to be using his limited public addresses to focus on platforming Wagner’s interests in Africa as opposed to commenting on the situation in Ukraine or reports of Wagner activity in Russia and Belarus, possibly indicating he is following imposed limitations on his involvement – even rhetorically – with the war in Ukraine.
Russian news outlet Kommersant reported that Russian authorities are developing a mechanism to fully control and shut off civilian mobile telecommunications networks in the event of a declared emergency, possibly related to pro-Ukrainian cross border raids. Kommersant reported on August 15 that Russian authorities are considering amendments to the Russian development strategy for the communications industry that would create a mechanism for law enforcement agencies and civilian communication operators to share frequencies and allow law enforcement agencies to take complete control over jointly used frequencies in the event of a declared emergency.[34] Kommersant reported that experts say it is possible that sharing frequencies could also improve the quality of mobile communications ”in peacetime” because operators will have access to previously restricted frequencies currently only used by Russian authorities.[35] Russian authorities may hope to institute such mechanisms to exert greater control of communications networks and the wider information space in the wake of recent events such as limited pro-Ukrainian cross-border incursions, wherein civilian communications greatly contributed to panic spreading and undermining the official Russian line of the incidents.[36]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 15 and reportedly advanced in Luhansk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike against targets mainly in Ukrainian rear areas on the night of August 14-15.
- The Kremlin is using the Army-2023 forum in Moscow (August 14-20) to foster bilateral military and political relations with other states and posture itself as a reliable and technologically advanced partner.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian government as effectively meeting Russian force generation efforts, portraying Western and Ukrainian resources as limited, and promoting international cooperation against the West.
- Wagner Group affiliated sources are undermining private military companies (PMCs) affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to comment on Wagner issues on the African continent to remain active in the information space but is notably refraining from commenting on the war in Ukraine.
- Russian news outlet Kommersant reported that Russian authorities are developing a mechanism to fully control and shut off civilian mobile telecommunications networks in the event of a declared emergency, possibly related to pro-Ukrainian cross border raids.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and reportedly advanced near Svatove and Bakhmut.
- Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 15 and reportedly advanced in Luhansk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, which is notably fighting near Urozhaine claimed on August 15 that Russian forces have entirely lost Urozhaine and blamed a lack of infantry and equipment for the loss of the settlement, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from the town.
- The Russian federal subject “Bashkortostan Regiment” volunteer formation has reportedly deployed to Ukraine.
- Russian authorities continue to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian cultural and educational sphere.
Go here to read the rest.
From Strategy Page:
The Ukrainian military plans to obtain and use 200,000 UAVs in 2023. Average cost for each UAV is $2,500, with some UAV types costing less than $1,000 while a smaller number cost over $10,000 each. The majority of these UAVs are basically loitering munitions that are sent out to areas where surveillance UAVs have spotted a lot of targets, usually enemy troops and vehicles. These UAVs have video cameras and a link to operators who view the video on a tablet or via goggles containing small video screens while the operators have a form of handheld game controller to maneuver the UAV and select a target for the UAV to collide with and explode.
While many of these have already been used in a variety of effective ways, loitering munitions have one tremendous advantage over earlier forms of firepower. Compared to bullets or artillery shells, a single loitering munition is much more likely to hit a target. In wartime it takes hundreds of artillery shells to cause one casualty. For rifle and machine-gun bullets, the number of bullets fired per casualty caused can be up to 100,000. Loitering munitions are much more effective because the operator scans the terrain below looking for a target. When one is found, the loitering munition attacks and almost always kills or wounds at least one soldier. Loitering munitions can be lost to enemy action. While small targets for riflemen or machine-gunners on the ground, they can be hi by ground fire. A more effective, and increasingly common way to defeat loitering munitions is EW (Electronic Warfare), specifically electronic jamming of the munitions control signal. As is common in combat, a jammer is not always available when you need it.
In some ways, loitering munitions are not as useful as artillery or bullets. Many artillery shells and bullets are not fired at a specific target or with the intent of causing casualties. This is what happens with suppressive fire, artillery or rifle fire is directed at an area to discourage the enemy from entering or moving into position to fire at your troops. You can consider a loitering munition overhead as a form of suppressive fire on the troops below. In that respect a loitering munitions does what snipers have been doing for over a century, forcing troops to stay out of sight or the known sniper will get you. This was common during World War I, when trench warfare made snipers useful for keeping enemy troops from observing the terrain between the trenches of opponents. In the 21st century more troops had access to affordable and very effective scopes for their rifles or even machine-guns. The American marines officially recognized this as a combat specialty and designated most snipers as “scout-snipers’ ‘ because their more useful skills involved observing as well as accurate shooting.
In armies with a lot of well-trained troops, about ten percent are designated and equipped to be snipers or sharpshooters. The latter is a soldier with a talent for accurate shooting but is not trained and equipped as a sniper. Professional soldiers in general are more likely to use individual, well aimed shots versus automatic fire, also known as spray and pray (that you hit something).
You can see how this works in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian troops are better trained in the accurate use of rifle fire. It was Ukrainian troops who frequently used commercial quadcopters equipped with grenade or small bomb carry and release mechanisms. The Ukrainian soldiers often bought commercial UAVs for this and spent hours at a time sending out their quadcopter to search for targets. The quadcopter would have to frequently land to recharge. That demonstrates another 21st century development; the proliferation of electronic devices an infantryman can and often will take with him into combat.
NATO nations learned from these Ukrainian experiences and have sent Ukraine what the Ukrainian say they need. For example, a month after the Russians invaded, the United States agreed to send Ukraine a large quantity of weapons, many of them specifically requested. One of these was called Phoenix Ghost, a system that was rapidly developed and built in the United States by Aevex Aerospace for the U.S. Air Force from specifications supplied by Ukraine. The air force revealed that the Phoenix Ghost was a project already in development before the Russians invaded. Ukrainians had already developed and built some innovative new weapons or modifications for existing ones the Americans were working on. The air force does not develop ground-based loitering munitions but does develop ones carried by aircraft. The Ukrainians made some suggestions which were included in the existing air force design and that resulted in the Phoenix Ghost, which went into production immediately.
In other words, Phoenix Ghost is a bespoke (custom made to user specifications) UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) developed and manufactured in record time. The primary new feature of this loitering munition was its longer (six hour) flight endurance. The U.S. sent Ukraine over 1,200 of these loitering munitions in the first year of the war. For a long time, all the public knew about Phoenix Ghost was that it was similar to the American Switchblade loitering munition that was also being sent to Ukraine. The input from Ukrainian engineers was essential because many of the most effective Soviet-era weapons engineers were Ukrainian. That meant Ukraine had a tradition of pragmatic and innovative weapons development that was mobilized after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and part of Donbas. The capabilities of the Ukrainian engineers were not exactly a state secret, it just wasn’t newsworthy. Foreigners familiar with weapons development knew about the Ukrainian skills and those who visited Ukraine for whatever reason, like American and other NATO military advisors, got a closer look at what those Ukrainian engineers could do. Those skills became even more important after the invasion began and suddenly engineers and scientists in other fields began applying their skills to rapidly develop new weapons and equipment to protect Ukraine from the Russians. After the invasion began the capabilities of the Ukrainian engineers became part of the reporting on how the Ukrainians stopped and turned back the Russian attack. That enabled the Ukrainian proposal for Phoenix Ghost to be taken seriously and rapidly implemented. The Ukrainian specified COTS (Commercial Off the Shelf) components and kept in touch via the high-speed Internet links provided by Starlink. The rumors of Phoenix Ghost indicate it is an improvement over Switchblade and mainly meant to be a more effective loitering munition. The Russians eventually experienced what the Ghost could do by examining the damage and reports from their troops.
Aevex Aerospace, the firm that developed and built Phoenix Ghost is itself a recent development, founded in 2017 and specializing in projects very similar to the Phoenix Ghost. Another American firm, AeroVironment, developed the Switchblade loitering munition and similar systems. Aevex is similar to AeroVironment, which has been around since 1971 and created many innovative commercial and military UAV designs.
Switchblade is little-known to the general public but extremely popular with American troops fighting in small units, especially in remote areas. Switchblade was first revealed in 2005 and the Ukrainians are receiving at least a hundred of the Switchblade 300 plus some of the larger Switchblade 600s, which appears to be closer in weight-class and performance as Phoenix Ghost.
Switchblade 300 is a small UAV fired from its storage container. Switchblade was sent to Afghanistan in 2009 for secret field testing. This was very successful and the troops demanded more, and more, and more. Switchblade completed development later in 2009 and was initially thought useful only for special operations troops. In 2011, after a year of successful field testing, the army ordered over a hundred Switchblades for troop use and since then has ordered a lot more.
While Switchblade was developed for the army, the marines apparently noted the success that soldiers and SOCOM (Special Operations Command) had with this system and ordered them as well. Switchblade was very popular with troops in Afghanistan and with SOCOM in all sorts of places they won’t discuss in detail. Switchblade is still used and thousands have been ordered and many of them used. There have been several upgrades.
Go here to read the rest. Unmanned aerial vehicles remind us we are in the 21rst century, and that war in this century is quite a bit different from war in the last century.
