The Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé (Oederlin)
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 22d transmitting a communication under date of the 20th from the German Government and to advise you that the President has instructed me to reply thereto as follows:
Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the 27th of September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany’s behalf, but from Ministers who speak for the Majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.
He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, [with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed,] provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.
The President would deem himself lacking in candour did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of the 20th of October, it does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determinating initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.
Accept [etc.]
There have been some good videos on WWI on YouTube. I have not followed them as closely as would have liked to.
Hindsight is 20/20, asit is so often said. One wonders if just a few things were handled differently, WWII might not have come to pass.
Scholars and buffs know more than I do. Whatever will there was on the part of Wilson or Lloyd George to be partial to Germany was outweighed by Clemenceau’s hostility and desire for revenge – and Germany’s long history of being a bad neighbor.
Germany was a collection of constitutional monarchies. There were no autocrats. I do wonder if the post-war regime might have retained more legitimacy had the monarchs remained and the German nobility had retained certain ceremonial privileges. Not sure what the effect of encouragement like this was as the ground seemed to turn to quicksand under all the ruling houses.
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One wonders if just a few things were handled differently, WWII might not have come to pass.
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Suspect the three most consequential factors were in the hands of the German establishment: the bad electoral system incorporated into the 1919 constitution, the destruction of the currency in 1922-24, and the refusal to devalue the currency at any point during the period running from 1929 to 1932. Another factor (born of the interaction between politicians and public) was the election of Paul v. Hindenburg in 1925.
Art:
The destruction of the monarchies had more to do with local, often Red-led revolts than Allied pressures. The appeal of Marxism predates the war and it competed with Nazism among many of the same classes through the ’20s. Ironically, it may have been Stalin’s machinations more than Hitler’s street-fights that did the greater damage to interwar German Communism.
The mark recovered very quickly from the disaster of 22-23. I have a 1923 200 mark coin struck in aluminum, and a 1924 in silver. 29-32 was the real killer of the powerful German economy, but Hitler had the sense to leave it alone, so that it recovered before many others. Had Roosevelt the same sense with ours, the second war just might have been forestalled.
The two elements of the Social Democratic Party which favored abolishing the monarchies in 1918 were the Spartacus League and the Independent Socialists. Between the two of them, they were good for about 12% of the electorate during Weimar. The republic was proclaimed by Philippe Scheidmann at a public address in November 1918. He’d gone rogue and not consulted with the other sachems of the Social Democratic Party before doing this.
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The mark did not ‘recover’ in 1924. Hjalmar Schacht in his capacity as governor of the central bank stopped the printing presses and instituted a new currency. It required concerted action to stop the madness.
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Hjalmar Schacht was also appointed minister of economy in 1932 by Franz v. Papen and retained first by Gen. v Schleicher and by Hitler. It was his program which was implemented in 1933. Hitler didn’t know anything about economics or finance.
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Had Roosevelt the same sense with ours, the second war just might have been forestalled.
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Have no clue what you fancy Roosevelt’s economic policies had to do with the 2d World War. That aside, an array of measures adopted in 1933 proved tonic for the economy and per capita product improved rapidly during the period running from 1933 to 1941 (especially during 1933-36). There were countries which during the period running from 1932 / 33 to 1939 had more rapid growth in per capita income than did the United States, but the list was not long (it included Chile, Germany, and Austria) and they weren’t taking advice from Andrew Mellon.
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According to Paul Johnson, Hitler didn’t like capitalism, but had other fish to fry and left the economy to sounder hands. The rapid recovery of the German economy was a propaganda flag waved during the period (even though the guys waving the flag had nothing to do with the recovery). That propaganda convinced some that he was on to something, feeding admiration in some minds, gloom in others.
My point: had Roosevelt taken a similar hands-off approach and the US economy recovered as fast or faster than the German, that particular piece of falsehood might have had less bite, resulting in more confident Allied action earlier than occurred. Johnson’s thesis may be challenged, of course.
My point: had Roosevelt taken a similar hands-off approach and the US economy recovered as fast or faster than the German, that particular piece of falsehood might have had less bite, resulting in more confident Allied action earlier than occurred. Johnson’s thesis may be challenged, of course.
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Again, the United States was not a consequential force in intra-European politics, so I’ve no clue why you think the economic dynamic in this country would have mattered.
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A ‘hands off’ approach is precisely what the Hoover administration followed from October 1929 to March of 1932. There’s a reason they abandoned it. It was a disaster. Hoover did attempt to persuade industrial kingpins to maintain nominal wages. His efforts were hortatory and the alternative (mass layoffs) eventually persuaded companies to abandon any such policy. There was also a small effort to manipulate commodity prices. Much is made of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, but its effects were contextually minor as American engagement with international markets was modest.
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There’s a mess of bad policies the Roosevelt Administration followed, some of which were scotched by the appellate courts. The economic recovery was slower than it otherwise might have been. It was still comparatively rapid.
Both sides of my ancestral German family emigrated to the US after the Franco-Prussian war. They correctly saw that the abolition of the German kingdoms and states in favor of a Prussian dominated empire was going to be a permanent thing. They saw little but conflict and war as was the habit of Prussia. After WW I, the rest of Europe was determined that Germany would not be in a position to use the military as an instrument of statecraft. Unfortunately, they overplayed their hand and engendered a reaction in Germany they were clearly not prepared to deal with. History, even back to Herodotus, has demonstrated that the best way to maintain peace is to prepare for war. The corollary is that power abhors a vacuum.
They saw little but conflict and war as was the habit of Prussia.
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Prussia was quite high-handed during the period running from 1864 to 1871. In an earlier era, they participated in the partitions of Poland and seized Silesia from the Hapsburgs. That having been said, Germany’s investment in overseas dependencies was quite modest compared to that of Britain and France and extended over a period of just 25 years (1892-1917). It was France, not Prussia, which attempted to conquer the bulk of Europe during the period running from 1792 to 1815. France during the period running from 1648 to 1789 was at war with one or another consequential power in Europe about 46% of the time. Not sure any other European power could match that.