From The Institute for the Study of War:
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 4, 2024
Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 4, 2024, 9 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:20pm ET on May 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces made a notable tactical advance northwest of Avdiivka near Arkhanhelske on the night of May 3 to 4, likely following a Ukrainian decision to withdraw from the area on May 3. A Russian milblogger posted footage on May 4 reportedly of elements of the Russian “Lavina” Battalion of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps) raising a flag in Arkhanhelske, and ISW geolocated this footage to northern Arkhanhelske.[1] Additional geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the eastern outskirts of Arkhanhelske.[2] ISW assesses that the Russian seizure of Arkhanhelske also indicates that Russian forces likely control Keramik and Novokalynove (both southeast of Arkhanhelske). Geolocated footage published on May 3 shows Ukrainian forces withdrawing from northern Arkhanhelske, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the settlement overnight on May 3 to 4 following the Ukrainian withdrawal.[3] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations to seize Arkhanhelske in several stages, with Russian forces advancing from Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka and southwest of Arkhanhelske) a week ago and Russian forces from Keramik (east of Ocheretyne) seizing the settlement on May 3.[4] Ukrainian forces may have decided to trade space for time as they wait for the arrival of US aid to the frontline at scale in the coming weeks – an appropriate decision for an under-resourced force at risk of being outflanked.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely trying to take advantage of the limited time window before the arrival of Western military aid deliveries by intensifying offensive operations and that Russian forces may make further tactical advances in this area in the near future.[6]
Russian forces appear to be choosing to exploit the tactical situation northwest of Avdiivka – a sound military undertaking – but their ultimate objective in this frontline sector remains unclear. Russian forces appear to be choosing to exploit the area where Russian forces are most likely to make tactical gains in the near future, but it is unclear if they will continue to drive north toward Toretsk or return to their previous focus on Pokrovsk to the northwest.[7] Russian forces have already committed roughly a division’s worth of combat power (comprised mainly of four Central Military District [CMD] brigades) to the frontline northwest of Avdiivka and were reportedly continuing to introduce additional forces in this general area.[8] Ukrainian sources have recently reported that Russia committed elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, CMD) to the Novobakhmutivka area (south of Ocheretyne).[9] Russian forces were likely to continue to push northwest of Avdiivka as long as there were opportunities to exploit the tactical situation in the area.
The Kremlin continues efforts to portray its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine as something other than what it is while continuing to assert the jurisdiction of Russian federal law over sovereign states. Russian state media reported on May 4 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) placed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk, and former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on Russia’s wanted list and opened criminal cases against the three Ukrainian leaders.[10] Russian state media noted that the Russian MVD did not specify Zelensky‘s, Pavlyuk‘s, or Poroshenko’s crimes nor the alleged crimes of the previous Ukrainian officials that Russia placed on its wanted list, including Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov and Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) Head Vasyl Malyuk. One Russian milblogger expressed hope that the warrant for Zelensky’s arrest will prevent Zelensky from visiting countries with an extradition treaty with Russia.[11] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) called the arrest warrants an act of Russian propaganda.[12] Ukrainian officials have recently warned that the Kremlin is intensifying an existing information operation called “Maidan 3” aimed at creating doubt about the legitimacy of Zelensky’s presidency among Ukrainians and that “Maidan 3” will likely peak around late May 2024.[13] The Kremlin’s decision to place Zelensky, Pavlyuk, and Poroshenko on Russia’s wanted list is likely part of Russia‘s “Maidan 3” information operation and of the Kremlin’s wider efforts to discredit the current and previous pro-Western Ukrainian governments that followed Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 as well as to isolate Ukraine diplomatically.[14]
The Kremlin’s decision to place Ukrainian officials on Russia’s wanted list is also an aspect of its continued efforts to assert the jurisdiction of Russian federal laws in sovereign European and post-Soviet countries where Russia has no legal jurisdiction. The Russian MVD has previously placed multiple officials from NATO member countries – including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – on Russia’s wanted list for allegedly breaking a variety of Russian federal laws within NATO member countries.[15] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s efforts to assert the jurisdiction of Russia’s efforts to set informational conditions justifying possible future Russian aggression against NATO states.[16]
Russian law enforcement conducted a search on May 4 of supporters of imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former officer Igor Girkin (aka Strelkov) in Tula Oblast, possibly in an attempt to set information conditions to ban the movement in Russia. Russian law enforcement officials, including the Federal Security Service (FSB) officials, reportedly conducted a search of the Russian Strelkov (Girkin) Movement (RDS) branch in Tula Oblast on May 4.[17] The RDS reported that Russian law enforcement officials searched the RDS Tula Oblast branch for members of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), who were recently found guilty by a local court of inscribing a “Freedom for Strelkov” slogan on a waste heap in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast on April 29.[18] A Russian Telegram channel, which published insider information from law enforcement agencies, reported that Russian law enforcement officials searched at least three RDS members and detained RDS member Alexander Omelchenko. Russian law enforcement officials later released Omelchenko but confiscated his phone. The RDS implied that Russian law enforcement officials are deliberately trying to discredit and ban the movement by claiming that the RDS is affiliated with RDK, which the Russian government has designated as a terrorist organization in Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin notably recently met with Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin on May 2, but it is unclear if these two events are related.[19]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces made a notable tactical advance northwest of Avdiivka near Arkhanhelske on the night of May 3 to 4, likely following a Ukrainian decision to withdraw from the area on May 3.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to portray its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine as something other than what it is while continuing to assert the jurisdiction of Russian federal law over sovereign states.
- The Russian law enforcement conducted a search on May 4 of supporters of imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former officer Igor Girkin (aka Strelkov) in Tula Oblast, possibly in an attempt to set information conditions to ban the movement in Russia.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka and Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- The Kremlin is continuing its ongoing campaign to centralize control over Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) irregular forces by co-opting DNR commanders and officials.
Go here to read the rest.
From Strategy Page:
May 4, 2024: Ukraine recently revealed the Sea Baby-2024 USV (Unmanned Surface Vehicle), a major upgrade of the 2023 model Sea Baby. This new USV carries 859 kg of explosives and has a range of 1,000 kilometers. These new USVs are cheap, costing $216,000 each.
Ukraine used USVs for the first time in 2022 when one was used to attack ships in Crimea’s Sevastopol Bay. An optional weapon for the new Sea Baby USV is six launching tubes for RPV-16 thermobaric rockets. These rockets have a range of 600 meters. The warhead detonates when it hits a target creating a cloud 2,500 degree heat that can kill or injure personnel within 80 meters of the detonation. First used by Ukrainian ground troops, in one case an RPV-16 warhead hit the room of a single story building, detonated, and destroyed the entire building. At sea, if one of these warheads landed on the deck of a warship the damage to any nearby personnel or weapons would be catastrophic. A hit against the hull could sink the ship, or at least put it out of action because of a hole at the waterline. Thermobaric explosives don’t work underwater, only in the atmosphere.
Because of Ukrainian attacks since 2022 with USVs, UAVs, and missiles, the Russian Black Sea Fleet lost 14 ships with several others badly damaged and towed to more distant portions of the Black Sea, including the Sea of Azov extension in the northeast and the more distant naval base at Novorossiysk. The remaining ships of the Black Sea Fleet include six guided missile cruisers, one corvette, seven diesel attack submarines, seven landing ships and dozens of High-speed landing craft, sea-going minesweepers, anti-saboteur boats, missile boats and anti-submarine ships. These ships rarely leave their well-guarded ports, even for a few days, because of the Ukrainian USVs that might be waiting for them. Ukrainian USVs are low in the water and are difficult to detect during the day and impossible to see at night.
Ukraine has several USV models, including the original Sea Baby, Mother, Malyuk and MAGURA. Sea Baby and Mother were developed by the Ukrainian Navy with assistance from the SBU secret service organization. At the end of 2023 Ukraine revealed an updated Mother USV with a top speed of 100 kilometers an hour. Manufacture of these USVs is done in underground production facilities to avoid Russian missile and guided bomb attacks.
Malyuk was used in a mid-2023 Kerch Bridge attack, carrying 850 kg of explosives to inflict significant damage on the bridge. MAGURA carries 320 kg of explosives while Mamai carries 450 kg. These USVs are no longer used just for delivering explosives against a target, as they can also be used for reconnaissance when equipped with video cameras that broadcast what they see back to the USV operator. Some USVs have been armed with small rocket launchers. Malyuk has a range of over 700 kilometers, which means they are suitable for operations on the high seas. Endurance is about 60 hours, and top speed is over 70 kilometers an hour. MAGURA has similar characteristics. Mamai was used in the long range attack at the distant naval base at Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea eastern coast, which is a thousand kilometers from Crimea.
Ukraine has been developing subsurface UUV (Unmanned Underwater Vessels) and in early 2023 the first one, the Toloka2 TK-150 entered service. This UUV was 2.5 meters long and equipped with a sensor mast that remained above the surface for navigation and to identify targets. Toloka2 can also carry a small explosive warhead. More recently, Ukraine developed the larger Marichka UUV that is 6 meters long and one meter in diameter. Ukraine seeks a Western manufacturer to build many more of these USVs and UUVs than Ukraine can.
Ukrainian USVs have been quite successful in attacking and sinking or disabling Russian navy ships. So far there have been twelve attacks which resulted in damage to 12 ships and the sinking of a cruiser, two small landing ships and one missile corvette. The longest range raids have been against targets in the Kerch Strait including the eighteen kilometer long Kerch Strait bridge, which has been repeatedly attacked by Ukrainian USVs. As of early 2024 the bridge is unusable and being restored. When repairs are finished, the Ukrainians will attack the bridge again. The Kerch Strait bridge is a vital supply line for Russian forces in the Crimean Peninsula. Sending supplies by sea is no longer practical because of the risk of attack by Ukrainian USVs. This leaves the Kerch Strait bridge and when that is out of commission, the only supply route is a road from Russia that is under observation by the Ukrainians, who can attack supply movements most of the time. This means Russian supply vehicles arrive in Crimea intermittently, leaving the Russian garrison weaker. Worse for the Russians, their Crimea garrison cannot hold out without fuel resupply.
Go here to read the rest. I hope our Admirals are taking copious notes. Naval warfare is changing swiftly and radically.
