From The Institute For The Study of War:
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 12, 2023
Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark
August 12, 2023, 3:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:10pm ET on August 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are maintaining a presence on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast in contrast to previous Ukrainian raids, but ISW does not yet assess that these positions constitute a bridgehead. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on the evening of August 11 that Ukrainian forces have established positions west of Kozachi Laheri after several days of limited raids across the Dnipro River.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue to operate west of Kozachi Laheri, but that the settlement itself is still under Russian control.[2] The milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian reconnaissance groups continue to operate near the Antonivsky Bridge and in the Hola Prystan area and conduct raids across the Dnipro River.[3] Continuing Russian claims that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east bank of the Dnipro River suggest that Russian forces are concerned that Ukrainian forces have established semi-lasting positions across the river.[4] Russian sources continue to describe Ukrainian groups operating on the left bank as small in size and fighting to be primarily between light infantry units. No Russian sources have indicated that Ukrainian forces on the left bank have the heavy equipment or vehicles likely required to establish a bridgehead that would be necessary to enable wider offensive operations into left bank Kherson Oblast.[5] An effective Russian mechanized counterattack could threaten this Ukrainian advance position, but it is unclear if Russian forces possess the mechanized reserves necessary to do so. ISW will continue to offer a conservative assessment of the situation on the east bank of Kherson Oblast until or unless ISW observes visual confirmation of an enduring Ukrainian presence on the east bank of Kherson Oblast. ISW has not yet observed visual evidence that Ukrainian forces have established a permanent position or have deployed a substantial number of personnel near Kozachi Laheri.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 12 and reportedly made tactically significant advances along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) directions.[6] Geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces made marginal gains near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area.[7] Russian milbloggers claimed late on August 12 that Russian forces abandoned their positions in Urozhaine after days of intense fighting, although ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these claims.[8]
The “Vostok” volunteer battalion, which is allegedly defending in the Urozhaine area, had earlier expressed concern that Russian forces would lose Urozhaine if the Russian military does not fix persistent issues with Russian counterbattery capabilities.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are effectively using electronic warfare systems to disrupt Russian communications in western Zaporizhia Oblast and retain large artillery and precision munitions stocks to support interdiction efforts against Russian forces there.[10] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces have significantly reduced the time between target identification and strikes on Russian targets with HIMARS rockets, warning that Russian forces need to move farther than 10km from the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast to be safe from Ukrainian strikes.[11]
Ukrainian forces reportedly launched two missile strikes targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge and a drone attack targeting occupied Crimea on August 12. Russian authorities claimed that Russian air defenses downed up to three Ukrainian ground attack missiles fired from S-200 systems targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also reported Ukrainian forces targeted occupied Crimea with 20 drones on the night of August 11–12.[13] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down 14 Ukrainian drones and downed another 6 drones with electronic warfare (EW) systems.[14] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian air defense units of the 31st Air Defense Division shot down one of the Ukrainian missiles near Kerch in occupied Crimea.[15] Russian sources claimed that Russian authorities stopped traffic on the bridge for several hours following the Ukrainian missile and drone strikes, creating a traffic jam of almost 1,300 cars.[16] Russian sources claimed that Crimean occupation authorities are initiating tougher criminal liability for publishing photos and videos showing locations of military installations such as air defenses, likely in response to a photo posted today showing the location of a Russian air defense system in occupied Crimea.[17] Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian logistics in Crimea are a part of a deliberate interdiction campaign aimed at setting favorable conditions for larger counteroffensive operations. Previous Ukrainian strikes on bridges along Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast continue to disrupt Russian logistics.[18]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are maintaining a presence on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast in contrast to previous Ukrainian raids, but ISW does not yet assess that these positions constitute a bridgehead.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 12 and reportedly made tactically significant advances along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly launched two missile strikes targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge and a drone attack targeting occupied Crimea on August 12.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 12 and made no confirmed gains.
- The Russian Ministry of Digital Development is preparing an amendment to the law on the conscription age that would increase the military service deferment age for IT specialists from 27 years to 30 years, likely in response to concerns about “brain drain” from Russia.
- Russian authorities are reportedly adjusting propaganda language about the war.
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From Strategy Page:
August 12, 2023: When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 they, and many foreign observers, believed Ukraine would be quickly defeated. That did not happen because Russia and many foreign experts ignored the most common cause of wars throughout modern history. Countries often overestimate their ability to win if they invade. Russia has made this mistake several times in the last few centuries but it’s a lesson that is rarely accepted and instead ignored.
The Russians have lost about 350,000 troops, of whom 100,000 are dead, missing, prisoners or deserters, and Ukrainians casualties are about 200,000 of whom 50,000 are killed, missing and captured.
In the case of Ukraine, Russia believed their larger population (140 million versus 40 million Ukrainians) and larger armed forces would guarantee a quick victory. As is customary, that didn’t happen. At that point Russia decided to pursue a long-war victory where their larger population and manufacturing capability would be decisive. This was another miscalculation. So far both Russia and Ukraine have lost about the same number of troops. To the Russians this means they can grind down the Ukrainians who will run out of troops before Russia does. This was another miscalculation.
After the first year of fighting Ukraine changed its tactic to limit Ukrainian casualties as much as possible. This is particularly the case with the current Ukrainian counteroffensive. Westerners expected progress to be rapid. That means more losses to the attackers. Instead, it uses its superiority in weapons, training and leadership so the Ukrainians are defeating the Russians in many smaller battles, where the Ukrainians make sure they have the advantage before attacking. This takes advantage of the poor morale, leadership and training most Russian troops have. There are some better quality airborne and special operations troops available but these must be used sparingly and carefully. While Russia can conscript or mobilize civilians into the military and send them into combat quickly with minimal training, these troops take heavy casualties. The elite units are volunteers who take a lot longer to train and losses are not easy to replace because it takes up to a year of training. During the first year of fighting Russia used the elite troops recklessly and lost a lot of them. Commanders of these elite units complained that this reckless approach was wasteful and counterproductive in the long run. It took a while for the senior political leaders and the generals who advised them to realize that misuse of elite units would hurt the Russian war effort in the long run.
The Ukrainian leadership was more aware of this situation and realized that losses in population were more serious than combat losses. So far about a quarter of the population has left voluntarily, most of them settling down in Poland and making themselves economically useful. Most of these refugees’ plan to return to Ukraine once it is safe, physically and economically, to do so. The Russians have kidnapped between two and four million Ukrainian civilians, many of them children, and moved them deep into Russia as part of Russia’s traditional ethnic cleansing policy towards troublesome minorities. About a third of the 44 million Ukrainians in 2021 have left or been kidnapped since the war began.
Millions of Russians too have fled Russia since the war began, mostly of military age, and most of those went to nearby Central Asian nations (the “Stans”) and made themselves economically useful. The “Stans” were initially unsure if all these Russian political refugees were a good thing, but changed their minds when they saw that the Russians were causing unexpected economic growth.
Russia eventually outlawed military age men from leaving the country. Russia needed more troops, and junior officers as well. The problem was that the need for more troops in Ukraine meant too many were being sent into combat with little training and led by equally inexperienced officers. Russia had a long-range plan to overcome that and the Ukrainians had their own plan to make life more difficult for the Russian military.
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The Russians have a real shortage of infantry willing to fight. They are heavily dependent upon elite units and Wagner troops. The Wagner troops are off the board due to the One Day Civil War and the mistrust of all things Wagner that it engendered in Putin. Evidence recently from the battlefield indicates that the Russian elite units are being ground down. Ukraine may be winning the battle of attrition.
