Ukraine War Analysis-March 14, 2022

From The Institute For the Study of War:

Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

March 14, 5:00 pm ET

Russian forces made small territorial gains in Luhansk Oblast on March 14 but did not conduct any major attacks toward Kyiv or in northeastern Ukraine. Russian forces continue to assemble reinforcements and attempt to improve logistical support in both the Kyiv and southern operational directions. Ongoing Russian efforts to replace combat losses with both Russian replacements and non-Russian sources, including Syrian fighters and the Wagner Group, are unlikely to enable Russia to resume major offensive operations within the coming week.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted several limited attacks northwest of Kyiv on March 14, unsuccessfully attempting to bridge the Irpin River.
• Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations east of Kyiv and continued to prioritize improving logistics and reinforcing combat units.
• The continued ability of Ukrainian forces to carry out successful local counterattacks around Kharkiv indicates that Russian forces are unlikely to successfully bypass Kharkiv from the southeast to advance toward Dnipro and Zaporizhia in the near term.
• Russian and proxy forces continue to achieve slow but steady territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast after initial failures in the first week of the Russian invasion.
• Ukrainian forces halted resumed Russian attacks from Kherson toward Mykolayiv and Kryvyi Rih on March 14.
• Russia will likely deploy small units of Syrian fighters to Ukraine within the week and is confirmed to have deployed private military company (PMC) forces.
• Russian and Belarusian forces increased their activity near the Ukrainian border in the last 24 hours in a likely effort to pin down Ukrainian forces but likely do not have the capability to open a new axis of advance into western Ukraine.
• Russia and China deny that Russia seeks military aid from China and claimed that Russia does not need additional military support to complete its objectives in Ukraine.

Russia continues to face difficulties replacing combat losses and increasingly seeks to leverage irregular forces including Russian PMCs and Syrian fighters. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Russian servicemen are increasingly refusing to travel to Ukraine despite promises of veteran status and higher salaries.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russia has recruited over a thousand Syrian fighters in “recent days” and that approximately 400 Syrian fighters have arrived in Russia.[2] Russia reportedly established training camps near Rostov (in Russia, directly east of Donbas) and Gomel (in Belarus, north of Kyiv). Senior Lieutenant Sergey Zavadsky of the Russian PMC Wagner Group was confirmed killed in Ukraine on March 13, the first verified Russian PMC casualty since the start of the invasion on February 24.[3]

Russian and Belarusian forces increased their activity near the Ukrainian border in the last 24 hours in a likely effort to pin down Ukrainian forces but likely do not have the capability to open a new axis of advance into western Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly conducting reconnaissance of settlements near the Ukrainian-Belarusian border in western Ukraine.[4] The General Staff additionally stated that Belarusian forces “strengthened the protection” of the Belarusian-Ukrainian border.[5] It is unclear if the Ukrainian General Staff has observed additional Belarusian forces deploying to the Ukrainian border or if troops already in place are increasing their readiness. ISW cannot independently confirm any additional Belarusian redeployments in the last 48 hours. Social media users observed Russian forces, including Rosgvardia units, deploying to southern Belarus on March 13-14.[6] These forces will likely reinforce existing Russian operations toward Kyiv. Russian and Belarusian forces likely seek to pin Ukrainian forces on the Belarusian border with the threat of new offensive operations, preventing those forces from reinforcing the defense of Kyiv. However, Russian and Belarusian forces remain unlikely to have the capability or intent to open a new axis of advance into western Ukraine at this time.

Go here to read the rest.  From Strategy Page:

March 14, 2022: The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not unexpected but the poor performance of the Russian military was a surprise, even to the Ukrainians. One of those surprises was the Russian inability to gain air superiority. The Russian air force has dominated the skies over Syria for years. But in Ukraine Russian helicopters (transports and gunships) as well as large transports were more often seen, and shot down, than Russian jet fighters and ground attack aircraft. The Russian helicopters still operate inside Ukraine, but have to do so carefully because the Ukrainians have received over 10,000 modern portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, which were distributed to hundreds of small teams of twenty or so soldiers and local volunteers who know the local terrain and secondary roads better than the Russians. These teams are directed to roads used by Russian convoys or areas where combat vehicles are concentrated and carry out surprise attacks. Local civilians report Russian activity and this is passed on to the attack teams. Ukraine also receives recent commercial satellite photos of Russian activity. Ukraine also has over twenty armed (with laser guided missiles) TB2 UAVs purchased from Turkey before the invasion with more delivered, via Poland, in early March.

The inability of the Russians to deal with TB2 is another mystery. Russia has encountered hostile TB2s in Libya and Armenia. In Libya Turkish forces were backing one faction in 2020-21 while Russian forces were supporting another. The TB2s inflicted a lot of damage on the Libyan forces Russian supported. This included destroying the new mobile Pantsir anti-aircraft system Russia had brought to Libya to deal with UAVs like the TB2. In 2021 Russian supported Armenian forces who were defeated by Turkish supported Azerbaijani forces. Ukrainians assumed that by early 2022 Russia had finally responded to the TB2 threat. For reasons still unexplained, that was not the case.

The initial airstrikes on Ukrainian military bases, using hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles, was also a failure because the Ukrainians received a warning from a reliable source a few hours before the attack and were able to disperse most of their troops and aircraft before the missiles hit.

Russian fighters and ground attack aircraft were not used, even though both of these aircraft types have been used regularly in Syria. The most likely reason for the absence of the jets in Ukraine was the lack of smart (GPS guided) bombs and laser guided missiles for these aircraft. Russian was seen using these bombs and missiles, briefly, in Syria. The reason was that, while Russia had developed these guided weapons at greats expense, it could not afford to buy many of them. Those used in Syria simply verified the guided weapons worked. Some had problems and Russia used the Syria experience to fix that. If Russia does have a small stockpile of these weapons, they are reserved for national emergencies. The Ukrainian invasion was, according to captured Russian planning documents, supposed to be over in fifteen days with a new pro-Russia government installed in the capital Kyiv. That was not considered a national emergency but an internal security operation.

The Russians underestimated the degree of Ukrainian resistance and key senior Russian officials believed most Ukrainians would support the Russian liberation effort. These attack plans were kept secret, in part because most Russians were more realistic and opposed a large-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The situation maps showing Russian troops in Ukraine are also misleading. Ukraine is a big country and the Russian forces are spread over a large area. Russians don’t control much territory as they concentrate on maintaining control of a few roads using roadblocks, check points and armed escorts for some supply convoys. Most of the time the roads are available to any civilian vehicles. This enables the Ukrainian ambush teams to reach a portion of a road suitable for an ambush, conceal themselves and their vehicles and wait for the approaching convoy. These battles mean Russian troops deeper inside Ukraine are usually short of fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, food and reinforcements. That accounts for the poor morale among the Russian forces and their lackluster performance. Another problem is that many of the 100,000 Russian troops inside Ukraine are conscripts doing their one year of service and banned, by law, from serving in a combat zone unless there is a national emergency. Ukraine has about 200,000 soldiers and reservists as well as over 100,000 armed volunteers defending Ukraine. These defenders have the support of nearly all Ukrainians while the invaders do not.

All these errors and poor decisions by Russian military and political leaders don’t guarantee a Ukrainian victory, but they make such a win a possibility.

One of the more embarrassing failures was the Russian inability to deal with the Turkish TB 2 armed UAVs Ukraine purchased from Turkey before the invasion. When Russian found out that Ukraine had ordered and received more TB2s after the invasion began, they complained to Turkey that it was taking sides in the war. President Erdogan of Turkey responded that the firm that developed and manufactured the TB2 was a private company and encouraged to sell as many TB2s as possible, especially to export customers. It was also known that the firm making the TB2 has Erdogan’s MIT-trained and entrepreneurial son-in-law as their technical director.

Go here to read the rest.  To conduct successful offensives the attacker needs three to one odds and troops willing to fight.  The Russians do not have three to one odds in their favor and their troops are giving increasing signs of being unwilling to die for Putin’s Ukraine adventure.