From The Institute For the Study of War:
Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 10, 4:00 pm EST
The likelihood is increasing that Ukrainian forces could fight to a standstill the Russian ground forces attempting to encircle and take Kyiv. Russian forces also appear to be largely stalemated around Kharkiv and distracted from efforts to seize that city. Russian advances in the south around Mykolayiv and toward Zaporizhya and in the east around Donetsk and Luhansk made little progress as well in the last 24 hours. Russia likely retains much greater combat power in the south and east and will probably renew more effective offensive operations in the coming days, but the effective reach and speed of such operations is questionable given the general performance of the Russian military to date. There are as yet no indications that the Russian military is reorganizing, reforming, learning lessons, or taking other measures that would lead to a sudden change in the pace or success of its operations, although the numerical disparities between Russia and Ukraine leave open the possibility that Moscow will be able to restore rapid mobility or effective urban warfare to the battlefield.
Russian forces around Kyiv did not attempt to renew offensive operations on a multi-battalion scale on March 10 following the failure of limited efforts on March 8-9. Ukrainian forces badly damaged a Russian armored column in the Brovary area east of Kyiv, likely further disrupting Russian efforts to set conditions for offensive operations on the east bank of the Dnipro. Ukrainian resistance all along the Russian lines of communication from eastern Kyiv to the Russian border near Sumy continues to disrupt Russian efforts to bring more combat power to bear near the capital. The episodic, limited, and largely unsuccessful Russian offensive operations around Kyiv increasingly support the Ukrainian General Staff’s repeated assessments that Russia lacks the combat power near the capital to launch successful offensive operations on a large scale.
Key Takeaways
- Russian operations around Kyiv remained largely stalled over the past 24 hours.
- Ukrainian forces badly damaged a Russian armored unit east of the capital, likely disrupting Russian efforts to encircle or assault the city from the east.
- Russian forces continue to struggle in efforts to seize Chernihiv city and to secure the long ground lines of communication from Sumy, which the Ukrainians still hold, to eastern Kyiv.
- A new Russian invasion from western Belarus, with or without Belarusian ground forces’ support, appears increasingly unlikely.
- Russian forces remain pinned down attempting to reduce Mariupol by siege and bombardment.
- Russian efforts to bypass Mykolayiv and establish a reliable ground line of communication across the Southern Bug River to the north of Mykolayiv remain stalled.
- Ukrainian air force and air defense operations continue to hinder Russian ground forces maneuver by likely limiting Russian close air support and exposing Russian mechanized forces to Ukrainian air and artillery attacks.
Go here to read the rest. From Strategy Page:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on February 24th was meant to overwhelm Ukrainian forces quickly and capture the capital Kyiv as well as other key targets like ports. This did not go according to plan because Russia underestimated the Ukrainian preparations to deal with an invasion and overestimated the readiness of Russian troops to carry out the rapid conquest plan.
The reasons why the Russians underestimated the capabilities of the Ukrainian defenders have yet to be explained. The problems with the Russian military were known in the West but Russia has been imposing more secrecy about such matters for Russians over the last few years. Before the invasion it was a crime to report on these problems in the mass media or via the Internet. The bad news reached Russians anyway, usually via a foreign Russian-language Internet site with confidential informants inside Russia. It was Russian software developers that created the most effective encrypted messaging apps, and usually had to leave Russia and run their new business from outside the country.
Before 2014 Ukrainians did not see a need for local defense units or a large military to defend against a Russian attack. After all, the Russians had signed an agreement in 1994 in which Russia promised to never attack Ukraine. In return, Ukraine got rid of the nuclear weapons it had inherited when the Soviet Union dissolved. The United States and Britain were also parties to that agreement, mainly to pay for disposing of the nukes and as well as aiding Ukraine if Russia broke the agreement.
When Russia violated the agreement in 2014, Ukraine sought advice from East European states that, until 1990, were occupied by Russian troops and had governments that answered to Russia, not their own citizens. These former Russian dominated states, especially Poland and the three Baltic States, joined NATO and the EU (European Union) as soon as they could and developed tactics and techniques for dealing with future Russian aggression. Until 2014 the original NATO members were skeptical of the new East Europe members assertion that it was not a matter of if the Russians would misbehave but when and where. That turned out of to be Ukraine, which until 2014 was willing to keep Russia happy by staying out of NATO. Ukraine still wanted to join the EU, which Russia opposed along with any cooperation with NATO countries.
Until 1991, NATO members prepared for a Russian invasion and developed some practices that the new East Europe NATO members adopted. This involved organizing internal defense units composed of former soldiers and volunteers. This was a variation of the Swiss system introduced in the 19th century in which every physically fit adult male belonged to an armed reserve until they were too old for that duty. These part-time soldiers kept a rifle and ammunition at home, so local defenses could be activated within hours. This force, plus the rugged terrain of Switzerland and a growing network of fortifications kept potential invaders from even trying. During World War II the Germans studied the matter to see if it was practical to try and occupy Switzerland. It wasn’t and the Germans never tried. Israel and Sweden adopted a similar defense system. After 1991 Sweden began dismantling their mass mobilization system, including an end to conscription. After 2014 Sweden returned to conscription and mass mobilization.
After 2014 Ukraine increased the ground forces to 250,000, with 20 percent of them civilian support staff. The government also ordered the formation of territorial defense units in each of the 22 provinces. By the end of 2014 these amounted to 32 battalions and were part of the armed forces. While the military supplied weapons, the 10,000 volunteers for the 32 battalions depended on themselves or donations for other equipment. This was a mistake because other nations threatened by Russia spent money on organizing and equipping local defense units. The Ukrainian territorial defense battalions varied in terms of quality and leadership. By the time Russia invaded in 2022 many of the local defense units had already attracted more volunteers and when the fighting began on February 24th, the local defense battalions continued to be a rallying point for civilian volunteers.
In 2019 Volodymyr Zelenskyy became president and enacted many reforms in the government, especially efforts to curb the chronic corruption. These reforms did not include the local defense units or the military in general. That did not happen until 2022, a month before the Russians invaded.
The local defense battalions were considered adequate after 2014 and volunteers also played a crucial role in halting the Russian advance in eastern Ukraine. Establishing a Swiss style force would cost more than Ukraine could afford and would have made a big difference deterring the Russians or containing Russian forces when the invasion did come.
Go here to read the rest. This is shaping up to being the biggest Russian military debacle since the Winter War with Finland in 1940-1941. The Soviets prevailed in that conflict with around 150K dead and 250K wounded. Putin is not Stalin. He cannot afford those type of casualties and keep control of Russia, nor can he dispose of the immense forces that Stalin could dispose of and bludgeon his way to victory. Thus the stalemate that we see, with the Russians repeating what they have been doing, with no better result. When a David beats a Goliath in a war it is usually not because David is so good, but because there is something deeply wrong with Goliath. The Ukrainians are far yet from winning this war, but the Russians seem to be doing their best, thus far, to lose it.
As usual, very interesting and cool by the fact that this is over absolutely deadly like to the job, and Ukrainians are clearly going to fight to the last man.
Among other sites at YouTube, “Binkov’s Battlegrounds” (operated by 3 very knowledgeable and tongue-in-cheek Croatian ex-military with a profound knowledge of Russian air and ground tactics, claiming to be “Marshall Binkov,” a Muppet-style puppet) and “Chris”, a profoundly informed young Austrian aviation expert at “Military Aviation History.”
For some months long before this crisis, both of them have said that the Russian Air Force (acronym “VVS”) is an organizational disaster. Anyone interested may I recommend to view their 5 to 20 minute presentations with quite profound detail.
A few salient points I’ve extracted from these experts for now:
According to “Binkov,” Russian Air Force pilots generally have only 100 hours or less—often far less, perhaps 40-50 hours—annually of operational flight time (USAF pilots average 200 hours). Nearly all of their ammunitions are “unguided” non-“smart” bombs. Model after model of the supposedly newer Russian fighter/fighter-bombers such as the MiG-35 “Fulcrum”, or the Sukhoi-34 “Fullback”, or Sukhoi 35 “Flanker” have serious design and/or field operational flaws and are mostly sidelined for this conflict (supposedly a flight of 7 or so SU-34s were used sometime in the early days of the war, and 4 were immediately shot down), so the VSS is relying on older Soviet-era types like the more reliable Sukhoi “20” series (24, 25, 27, etc—- nearly all first designed in the 1970’s-80’s) which rely on older television screen visual active guidance of arms and missiles by the copilot. This puts these SU-20-series aircraft in line-of-sight for Stinger/MANPAD armaments by the Ukrainians, which have exacted a heavy price. This is the primary reason that the Russian Air Force mostly absent over Ukraine, and the Army is using ground-launched mobile missile units to destroy enemy strongpoints—or civilian centers.
The VSS also has no effective tactical means to bring in troops by aerial means: the Ilyushin IL-76 transport aircraft has been almost completely grounded for over a decade and apparently only a handful are airworthy. That means the SV (Army) had to try to bring in special forces units at the Kiev airport in the first days of this war, which was a complete slaughter, because of the aforementioned Ukrainian Stinger missile array (thank Trump for that).
Binkov also states that only about 1% of the VSS is truly stealth—-Compared to 17% of the USAF. There are many speculations as to why they have held out their stealth aircraft, but likely they have not proven capable in war games.
There is much more. One can’t be sure the Russians are showing all their cards since they clearly thought this was going to be a Varsity v. JV game—and, wow, we’re they wrong. But the Ukrainians are on much more of a level playing field then previously thought.
“Very interesting and cool-headed analysis, though this is a deadly cinflict”—I meant to type—darn auto-check.
Were I a mid-level NATO officer, I might be losing some of my fear of the Russian military at this point. Sounds like if everyone kicks in their 2%, stays patient, vigilant and well-trained, the shadow of Stalin will never return (certainly not with Russia’s plummeting demographics).
(certainly not with Russia’s plummeting demographics).
The total fertility rate for Russia is about the European average.