From The Institute For The Study of War:
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 22, 6:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian occupation officials in Zaporizhia Oblast have obliquely declared the region’s independence from Ukraine by falsely identifying Ukrainian citizens entering the occupied region as temporary asylum seekers. Head of the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration Yevheny Balitsky signed an order that designates Ukrainian citizens arriving in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast as temporary asylum seekers based on Russian law.[1] The order requires the registration of Ukrainian and Russian citizens based on their place of residence or place of arrival in the Russian-occupied parts of Zaporizhia Oblast and requires the distribution of temporary identification forms for all “stateless persons.” Ukrainians and Russians may register if they present proof of their temporary asylum application. This decree has various implications under both international law and domestic Russian law. International law states that a refugee is an individual from outside the country (or who is stateless) who is seeking “temporary asylum” in another country to escape persecution.[2] Russian law defines a refugee as a person ”who is outside of his/her country of nationality or habitual residence.”[3] Neither of these statuses properly apply to the majority of people crossing from unoccupied Ukraine into occupied Zaporizhia.
Russian occupation authorities are thus falsely classifying all Ukrainians entering occupied territories in Zaporizhia Oblast as refugees escaping persecution in Ukraine. The order also de facto identifies Ukraine as a separate country from the Zaporizhia Oblast entity, as defined by the occupation authority. By classifying all Ukrainians as refugees, Russian occupation authorities are establishing a new legal category that might have its own restrictions. Russian occupation authorities may use the refugee status to restrict Ukrainians who temporarily return to occupied territories after evacuating from them. The order will likely affect Ukrainian citizens traveling to occupied Kherson Oblast via the checkpoint in Vasylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, as the order requires the registration of individuals at the point of arrival in the occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and Vasylivka is the checkpoint serving Kherson as well as Zaporizhia Oblasts.
Key Takeaways
- Russian-backed occupation authorities in Zaporizhia Oblast have obliquely declared the independence of the occupied areas of the oblast by falsely identifying Ukrainian citizens entering from unoccupied Ukraine as temporary asylum seekers.
- Russian forces conducted localized spoiling attacks southwest and southeast of Izyum.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks southeast of Siversk and northeast and south of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces continued attempts to advance from the northern and western outskirts of Donetsk City and conducted limited ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City.
- Russian forces made marginal gains along the Mykolaiv-Kherson line.
- Ukrainian intelligence stated that the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) will start “general mobilization” processes on September 1.
- Prymorsky Krai announced the formation of a new repair and service volunteer battalion.
- Ukrainian partisans continued to conduct attacks against Russian forces in occupied Melitopol.
Go here to read the rest.
From Strategy Page:
While Russian manpower inside Ukraine declines, the Ukrainians are seeking to train the many volunteers that joined the military after the invasion. Even with losses from six months of fighting, there are still nearly 700,000 of these volunteers. Most require training before they are up to the standards required for a successful offensive to push the remaining (under 200,000) Russian forces out.
Even before the invasion, NATO had been assisting in training Ukrainian forces. This accelerated after 2014 and by the end of 2021 most of the Ukrainian 200,000 troops were adequately trained. These troops suffered heavy losses in the first six months of the war and must now be supplemented by trained volunteers. There was little formal training for volunteers in the first few months of the war. Weapons were distributed and training was often on-the-job.
Being on the defensive requires less skill and experience but does benefit from enthusiasm and steadfastness. Still, casualties were high, especially when the Russians were using a lot of artillery. Trained troops know to quickly disperse and dig in, not just in trenches and foxholes but also with sturdy overhead cover.
Part of the NATO support was offered to conduct training outside of Ukraine. Some were carried out in Poland and more distant locations like Britain. There were language barriers and some of the training outside Ukraine was for new weapons systems. The Ukrainians proved to be quick learners and mastered technical skills in days that conventional military training programs spent weeks on. That urgency and motivation is what still propels Ukrainian volunteers but, for offensive warfare, a lot more skills must be acquired.
To do that NATO nations are expanding their training programs and allocating some of those efforts to teach experienced volunteers how to operate basic and advanced military training inside Ukraine. This would involve shorter, more intense training programs that are possible if the trainees are eager to do it and do it well. Even with all this it still takes several weeks to turn an untrained volunteer into a trained soldier with some of the essential skills needed to carry out offensive operations that are not suicidal. In other words, the volunteers how to avoid fighting like Russians.
Going on the offensive unprepared is not good for maintaining morale and enthusiasm. Two key elements of a successful offensive are competent staff and senior officers to plan and organize the offensive operations, and competent junior officers and senior NCOs in the combat units to carry out the plan effectively. Senior officers and planners Ukraine has, but there is a shortage of NCOs and lower ranking officers needed to lead platoon (30-40 men) and company (three or four platoons) units. The infantry has always suffered most of the casualties and the number of casualties those are depends on the quality of training, leadership and support (artillery, intel on the enemy and good communications). The support is there, the major weakness continues to be training levels and shortages of NCOs and combat unit officers.
Ukraine has also been quietly devoting a lot of resources to supporting the armed resistance in Russian occupied territory. Ukraine already had an effective special operations force. These capabilities were demonstrated after 2014 when Ukrainian special operations were responsible for foiling Russian operations in Donbas. Work was already underway to carry out covert and sabotage missions in Russian occupied territory but that was difficult because Ukraine was not actively trying to take back Crimea and Donbas until after Russia invaded all of Ukraine in 2022. It took about six months to recruit, train and organize attacks on Russian bases, Russian officials and Ukrainian collaborators. This lifts the morale of the Ukrainian troops preparing to go on the offensive.
Go here to read the rest. Russia seems to be attempting to hold what they have gained, while the Ukrainian’s are building a force to take back what they have lost.
