“We made a great mistake, Mr. Hill, in the beginning of our struggle, and I fear, in spite of all we can do it will prove to be a fatal mistake.”
“What mistake is that, general?”
“Why, sir, in the beginning we appointed all our worst generals to command the armies, and all our best generals to edit the newspapers. As you know, I have planned some campaigns and quite a number of battles. I have given the work all the care and thought I could, and sometimes, when my plans were completed, as far as I could see, they seemed to be perfect. But when I have fought them through, I have discovered defects and occasionally wondered I did not see some of the defects in advance. When it was all over, I found by reading a newspaper that these best editor generals saw all the defects plainly from the start. Unfortunately, they did not communicate their knowledge to me until it was too late.” Then, after a pause, he added, with a beautiful, grave expression I can never forget: “I have no ambition but to serve the Confederacy, and do all I can to win our independence. I am willing to serve in any capacity to which the authorities may assign me. I have done the best I could in the field, and have not succeeded as I could wish. I am willing to yield my place to these best generals, and I will do my best for the cause in editing a newspaper.”
Georgia Senator Benjamin H. Hill relating a conversation with General Robert E. Lee
Okay all you armchair generals! Go here to see if you could have done better than Lee at Gettysburg.
I won a “Significant Confederate Victory!”
You may saddle my horse.
“Significant Confederate Victory” for me, too! (It helped that Don & I have been watching the movie Gettysburg again; I tried to choose the options which were the least similar to what was done historically.)
This is indeed true. With the hindsight of historical fact, I was able to proceed to my victory. With the hindsight of this “significant victory,” I was able on my second try to obtain the elusive “Decisive Confederate Victory.” Thus, General Phillip was able to defeat the Yankees and help establish the Confederate States of America!
Eeesh…I should not be a general. I kept losing to the Union….
Significant Confederate Victory for me, too.
What I was honestly thinking was: Decision One, push them out of town. I know from history that that’s how the Union Army gets the high ground, but it seems like the right move. Decision Two, caution. Don’t attack the fortified high ground.
Decision Three, what I want to do is get out of the battle. This may be the 20/20 hindsight of the newspaper editor, but I’m not crazy about the battlefield. Can we dig in and wait it out? Send Longstreet around the right side and maybe take the enemy off-guard? Or send Longstreet north to burn towns and destroy railroad tracks? I’m not given those options, so given my obsession with high ground, I sent Longstreet deep left to take the Round Tops.
Decision Four. Finally I’m allowed to send troops around the right flank, and I do so. The Union Army escapes, but I won the battle.
I’ve got two questions that I’d love the history buffs to answer. One, Longstreet’s men: are there decent artillery units among them? Would capturing the heights be as much of an advantage as I think it would? Secondly, let’s say you encircle the Union. Is that really such a benefit? You can wait them out, sure, but if they’re above you and well-supplied it could get ugly. And can you charge a line from the front and behind without slaughtering your own men?
Although Sickles did just about everything in his power to assist Lee . . .
Lee gave Meade “Fredericksburg in reverse.”
Sears: Gettysburg was Lee’s defining defeat. Lee’s acts were “uniquely uncharacteristic.”
Union Army respected the Confederate, never deceived itself about the outcome.
Meade’s accomplishments: fourth day in command; fought a defensive battle as intended; the fighting men were “remarkable” Capt. Fiske, “. . . Army of the Potomac has redeemed its reputation and covered itself with glory . . “
From day-one, Lee should have taken a strongly defensible position and allowed Meade to attack. If Meade sat, Lee could have out-maneuvered Meade any way he chose.
I’m behind in my Sears’ Gettysbug read: just finished the second day.
Here is what I get from Sears: Meade was all over the battlefield and hands on CinC.
Lee set his plan and sat by: did nothing. Same same Ewell’s staff. Sears has them lying around on the grass.
Hancock was magnificant; all over the center of the field.
Pacem Movie: Longstreet was not that perfect; although Sears has him all over the field. Just not magnificant like Hancock.
The Union everywhere held (it bent, it didn’t break) the line against the best Longstreet and Ewell threw at it. Interior Union lines of communication could move reserves wherever needed. And, at the end of the day, two fresh Union corps came on line, while all Lee had left was Pickett’s division for the grand attack on the center.
Ewell’s corps could have attacked closer to the center and better coordinated with Longstreet’s. I think all the weight of Confederate forces should have attacked the center (the opposite of Marathon), the ground was better than either flank which were variously boulder-strewn, had building to break infantry formations, steep, wooded, or poor attack avenues. That Union gen’l on Culp’s Hill had the foresight to throw up breastworks.
After the ineffectual attacks of the second day, I wonder how Lee could imagine that Pickett would succeed. This arm-chair field marshall looking back 150 years agrees with some French general’s remark on the Charge of the Light Brigade: it was magnificent, but it wasn’t war.
From the “irish Blues”, “The reduced brigade was then led into battle at Gettysburg by Colonel Kelly (replaced Megaher in May 1863). By this time the three New York regiments had been formed in battalions of two companies each, while the 116th Pennsylvania was one battalion of four companies. During the famous Confederate charge of July 3, one thought kept recurring to the commanding officer of the 116th. “It was Fredericksburg reversed.” A more profound thought, perhaps, occurred to a private when he was informed his regiment would be held in reserve. “In resarve, yis,” he muttered, “resarved for the heavy fightin’.”
“are there decent artillery units among them?”
Just reading Sear’s Gettysburg and another’s Campfires and Battlefields: Yes, better than decent. However, the Union artillery was magnificent.
Today’s WSJ Op-ed page has a story on the very late MoH recommendation for 1Lt Alonzo Cushing, a Unon battery CO. The attacking forces’ art. is limited by distance (even when it moves forward with the attackers) and once the inf. closes with the opp. inf, its art. needs to stop – friendly fire worries. The Union art. went to double canister and cut short fuses wherein the shells (ran out of canister) would burst at the gun muzzles. The Union art. fought like hell.
Also, not certain whether it was Meade or Hooker, the Union art. was reorganized before Gettysburg with much better (centralized) command and control over the art. for the entire force present. Interior lines of comm.
If Little RT fell, Longstreet would have the entire Union Army flanked. Ewell, theoretically, would have an “easier” assault. Note: some of Longstreet’s regiments had marched and counter-marched all that hot day even before they went in.
Maybe the Union could have fought it, maybe not: among Ares’ sons are DEIMOS (or Deimus) the god (daimon) of fear, dread and terror, and his twin-brother PHOBOS (Phobus) of panic fear, flight and battlefield rout. It would be difficult to change a regiment’s front. How much more difficult to turn a divion and a corps. Imagine the confusion under fire.
“Secondly, let’s say you encircle the Union.” I do not think there were enough men in both armies, possibly on the Continent, to effectively barricade the Union army given the lenght of its lines, and the “fish hook” shape.
There was a third-day, big cavalry fight behind the Union positions, which the Union cav decisively won.
I don’t know why, but I have a strong desire to pick apart Captain Fiske’s comments word by word.
That’s tough, trying to organize your line while the enemy has skilled artillery units positioned above you. Thanks for the analysis.
I won the battle, but failed to prevent the escape of the Army of the Potomac.
As I see it, the key to the victory was ordering — rather than suggesting, as Lee did –Ewell’s Corps to take the high ground on the evening of the first day. (It is almost certain that, had Jackson lived and been in command that day, this is exactly what he would have done: For him, though not for Ewell, Lee’s suggestions were tantamount to commands.)
My assaults on the second and third days were concentrated on the north end of the Federals’ position, using the higher terrain my forces occupied as a force-multiplier to overcome the virtual equivalency in numbers of the Federal forces opposing mine.
One thing that the simulation does not do, which would have been interesting, is to factor in the arrival (finally!) of Stuart’s cavalry on the second day. It would be interesting to see how assigning a suitably chastened and motivated Jeb the mission of harrassing the withdrawing Federals might have worked out, though the improved quality of Buford’s, Kilpatrick’s, and Custer’s cavalry units would ensure it would not have been a Confederate romp.