After the brilliant flank attack of Jackson on May 2, 1863 which wrecked the Union 11th Corps, Lee still faced a daunting situation as morning dawned on May 3. Hooker had been reinforced by Reynolds Corps overnight which made good his losses and Lee’s Army of approximately 43,000 faced 76,000 troops under Hooker. His forces were also divided with Jackson’s Corps, now temporarily commanded by General Jeb Stuart after Jackson’s wounding, located behind the right of the Union army. If this were not a bad enough situation, Lee still had Sedgwick south of Fredericksburg with 40,000 men confronting the 11,000 of Early. If Sedgwick attacked, Lee could be facing an attack from his rear. Unbeknownst to Lee, in the wake of the flank attack of Jackson, Hooker had sent an urgent message to Sedgwick ordering him to attack immediately.
The first thing Lee had to do was to reunite his army confronting Hooker. Lee in his official report details how this was done:
Early on the morning of the 3d, General Stuart renewed the attack upon the enemy, who had strengthened his right during the night with additional breastworks, while a large number of guns, protected by intrenchments, were posted so as to sweep the woods through which our troops had to advance. Hill’s division was in front, with Colston in the second line and Rodes in the third. The second and third lines soon advanced to the support of the first, and the whole became hotly engaged. The breastworks at which the attack was suspended the preceding evening were carried by assault under a terrible fire of musketry and artillery. In rear of these breastworks was a barricade, from which the enemy was quickly driven. The troops on the left of the Plank road, pressing through the woods, attacked and broke the next line, while those on the right bravely assailed the extensive earthworks, behind which the enemy’s artillery was posted. Three times were these works carried, and as often were the brave assailants compelled to abandon them–twice by the retirement of the troops on their left, who fell back after a gallant struggle with superior numbers, and once by a movement of the enemy on their right, caused by the advance of General Anderson. The left, being re-enforced, finally succeeded in driving back the enemy, and the artillery under Lieutenant-Colonels [T. H ] Garter and [H. P.]Jones being thrown forward to occupy favorable positions secured by the advance of the infantry, began to play with great precision and effect. Anderson, in the meantime, pressed gallantly forward directly upon Chancellorsville, his right resting upon the Plank road and his left extending around toward the furnace, while McLaws made a strong demonstration to the right of the road. As the troops advancing upon the enemy’s front and right converged upon his central position, Anderson effected a junction with Jackson’s corps, and the whole line pressed irresistibly on. The enemy was driven from all his fortified positions, with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and retreated toward the Rappahannock. By 10 a.m. we were in full possession of the field. The troops, having become somewhat scattered by the difficulties of the ground and the ardor of the contest, were immediately reformed preparatory to renewing the attack. The enemy had withdrawn to a strong position nearer to the Rappahannock, which he had previously fortified. His superiority of numbers, the unfavorable nature of the ground, which was densely wooded, and the condition of our troops after the arduous and sanguinary conflict in which they had been engaged, rendered great caution necessary. Our preparations were just completed when further operations were arrested by intelligence received from Fredericksburg.
What Lee had feared now became reality. Sedgwick was attacking Early:
General Early had been instructed, in the event of the enemy with. drawing from his front and moving up the river, to join the main body of the army with so much of his command as could be spared from the defense of his lines. This order was repeated on the 2d, but by a misapprehension on the part of the officer conveying it, General Early was directed to move unconditionally. Leaving Hays’ brigade and one regiment of Barksdale’s at Fredericksburg, and directing a part of General Pendleton’s artillery to be sent to the rear, in compliance with the order delivered to him, General Early moved with the rest of his command toward Chancellorsville. As soon as his withdrawal was perceived, the enemy began to give evidence of an intention to advance, but the mistake in the transmission of the order being corrected, General Early returned to his original position. The line to be defended by Barksdale’s brigade extended from the Rappahannock, above Fredericksburg, to the rear of Howison’s house, a distance of more than 2 miles. The artillery was posted along the heights in rear of the town. Before dawn on the morning of the 3d, General Barksdale reported to General Early that the enemy had occupied Fredericksburg in large force and laid down a bridge at the town. Hays’ brigade was sent to his support, and placed on his extreme left: with the exception of one regiment stationed on the right of his line behind Howison’s house. Seven companies of the Twenty-first Mississippi Regiment were posted by General Barksdale between the Marye house and the Plank road, the Eighteenth and the three other companies of the Twenty-first occupied the Telegraph road at the foot of Marye’s Hill, the two remaining regiments of the brigade being farther to the right, on the hills near Howison’s house. The enemy made a demonstration against the extreme right, which was easily repulsed by General Early. Soon afterward a column moved from Fredericksburg along the river bank, as if to gain the heights on the extreme left, which commanded those immediately in rear of the town. This attempt was foiled by General Hays and the arrival of General Wilcox from Banks’ Ford, who deployed a few skirmishers on the hill near Taylor’s house, and opened on the enemy with a section of artillery. Very soon the enemy advanced in large force against Marye’s and the hills to the right and left of it. Two assaults were gallantly repulsed by Barksdale’s men and the artillery. After the second, a flag of truce was sent from the town to obtain permission to provide for the wounded. Three heavy lines advanced immediately upon the return of the flag and renewed the attack. They were bravely repulsed on the right and left, but the small force at the foot of Marye’s Hill, overpowered by more than ten times their numbers, was captured after a heroic resistance, and the hill carried. Eight pieces of artillery were taken on Marye’s and the adjacent heights. The remainder of Barksdale’s brigade, together with that of General Hays and the artillery on the right, retired down the Telegraph road. The success of the enemy enabled him to threaten our communications by moving down the Telegraph road, or to come upon our rear at Chancellorsville by the Plank road. He at first advanced on the former, but was checked by General Early, who had halted the commands of Barksdale and Hays, with the artillery, about 2 miles from Marye’s Hill, and re-enforced them with three regiments of Gordon’s brigade. The enemy then began to advance up the Plank road, his progress being gallantly disputed by the brigade of General Wilcox, who had moved from Banks’ Ford as rapidly as possible to the assistance of General Barksdale, but arrived too late to take part in the action. General Wilcox fell back slowly until he reached Salem Church, on the Plank road, about 5 miles from Fredericksburg.
Lee sent reinforcements to Early:
Information of the state of affairs in our rear having reached Chancellorsville, as already stated, General McLaws, with his three brigades and one of General Anderson’s, was ordered to re-enforce General Wilcox. He arrived at Salem Church early in the afternoon, where he found General Wilcox in line of battle, with a large force of the enemy— consisting, as was reported, of one army corps and part of another, under Major-General Sedgwick–in his front. The brigades of Kershaw and Wofford were placed on the right of Wilcox, those of Semmes and Mahone on his left. The enemy’s artillery played vigorously upon our position for some time, when his infantry advanced in three strong lines, the attack being directed mainly against General Wilcox, but partially involving the brigades on his left. The assault was met with the utmost firmness, and after a fierce struggle the first line was repulsed with great slaughter. The second then came forward, but immediately broke under the close and deadly fire which it encountered, and the whole mass fled in confusion to the rear. They were pursued by the brigades of Wilcox and Semmes, which advanced nearly a mile, when they were halted to reform in the presence of the enemy’s reserve, which now appeared in large force. It being quite dark, General Wilcox deemed it imprudent to push the attack with his small numbers, and retired to his original position, the enemy making no attempt to follow.
On May 4 Hooker remained passive allowing Lee to concentrate his forces against Sedgwick who was forced to retreat across the Rappahannock. Hooker learning on May 5, that Sedgwick had withdrawn, retreated on the evening of May 5-6. The battle of Chancellorsville was over.
Lee had won an incredible victory against an army that outnumbered his forces more than two to one, but at a terrible cost. His casualties were almost 13,000, only some 4,000 less than the Union casualties. Lee had cemented his reputation as one of the great Captains of history, but he had been unable to destroy the Army of the Potomac.
Hooker would be dismissed from command of the Army of the Potomac on June 28, 1863 in the midst of the Gettysburg campaign. He would regain some of his professional prestige by serving as a competent corps commander in the Chattanooga and Atlanta campaigns. He would remain bitter about his loss at Chancellorsville for the remainder of his life, blaming all and sundry, especially Generals Sedgwick and Howard. It is possible that Hooker did state the truth about what happened at Chancellorsville once. According to a staff officer almost five decades after the event, General Abner Doubleday asked Hooker during the Gettysburg campaign what went wrong with him at Chancellorsville. Hooker supposedly said that he had simply lost faith in Joe Hooker.
Union morale plummeted in the wake of Chancellorsville with many commenters wondering that if the Army of the Potomac could not beat Lee with a two to one advantage, when could it beat him. Lincoln summed up the popular despair: ‘My God! My God! What will the country say! What will the country say!’
