June 17, 1812: Congress Declares War on Great Britain

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On June 18, 1812, President James Madison signed the declaration of war passed by Congress on June 17, 1812, starting the War of 1812.  I think it is safe to say that rarely has the United States gone to war more ill-prepared than in 1812, with an Army of 7,000 men and a Navy with 12 combat vessels, which is odd considering that there was no precipitating crisis that mandated a declaration of war at the time.  The United States could have prepared for the conflict and then declared war, but no such pre-war preparation occurred.

The vote totals in Congress, in the House 79-49 and in the Senate 19-13, indicated that the war was largely at the desire of one political party, the Jeffersonian Republicans, and opposed by the Federalists.  The opposition of the Federalists would continue throughout the war, and the conflict would be bitterly divisive in the United States.

The whole undertaking has a fairly surreal quality in retrospect, with the Madison administration, propelled by the War Hawks in Congress, undertaking a war that the President himself thought unwise and ill-considered against the mightiest Empire in the world.

Here is the text of the war message sent by President Madison on June 1, and which served as the basis for the declaration of war:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

I communicate to Congress certain documents, being a continuation of those heretofore laid before them on the subject of our affairs with Great Britain.

Without going back beyond the renewal in 1803 of the war in which Great Britain is engaged, and omitting unrepaired wrongs of inferior magnitude, the conduct of her Government presents a series of acts hostile to the United States as an independent and neutral nation.

British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it, not in the exercise of a belligerent right founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects. British jurisdiction is thus extended to neutral vessels in a situation where no laws can operate but the law of nations and the laws of the country to which the vessels belong, and a self-redress is assumed which, if British subjects were wrongfully detained and alone concerned, is that substitution of force for a resort to the responsible sovereign which falls within the definition of war. Could the seizure of British subjects in such cases be regarded as within the exercise of a belligerent right, the acknowledged laws of war, which forbid an article of captured property to be adjudged without a regular investigation before a competent tribunal, would imperiously demand the fairest trial where the sacred rights of persons were at issue. In place of such a trial these rights are subjected to the will of every petty commander.

The practice, hence, is so far from affecting British subjects alone that, under the pretext of searching for these, thousands of American citizens, under the safeguard of public law and of their national flag, have been torn from their country and from everything dear to them; have been dragged on board ships of war of a foreign nation and exposed, under the severities of their discipline, to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes, to risk their lives in the battles of their oppressors, and to be the melancholy instruments of taking away those of their own brethren.

Against this crying enormity, which Great Britain would be so prompt to avenge if committed against herself, the United States have in vain exhausted remonstrances and expostulations, and that no proof might be wanting of their conciliatory dispositions, and no pretext left for a continuance of the practice, the British Government was formally assured of the readiness of the United States to enter into arrangements such as could not be rejected if the recovery of British subjects were the real and the sole object. The communication passed without effect.

British cruisers have been in the practice also of violating the rights and the peace of our coasts. They hover over and harass our entering and departing commerce. To the most insulting pretensions they have added the most lawless proceedings in our very harbors, and have wantonly spilt American blood within the sanctuary of our territorial jurisdiction. The principles and rules enforced by that nation, when a neutral nation, against armed vessels of belligerents hovering near her coasts and disturbing her commerce are well known. When called on, nevertheless, by the United States to punish the greater offenses committed by her own vessels, her Government has bestowed on their commanders additional marks of honor and confidence.

Under pretended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force and sometimes without the practicability of applying one, our commerce has been plundered in every sea, the great staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate markets, and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interests. In aggravation of these predatory measures they have been considered as in force from the dates of their notification, a retrospective effect being thus added, as has been done in other important cases, to the unlawfulness of the course pursued. And to render the outrage the more signal these mock blockades have been reiterated and enforced in the face of official communications from the British Government declaring as the true definition of a legal blockade “that particular ports must be actually invested and previous warning given to vessels bound to them not to enter.”

Not content with these occasional expedients for laying waste our neutral trade, the cabinet of Britain resorted at length to the sweeping system of blockades, under the name of orders in council, which has been molded and managed as might best suit its political views, its commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers.

To our remonstrances against the complicated and transcendent injustice of this innovation the first reply was that the orders were reluctantly adopted by Great Britain as a necessary retaliation on decrees of her enemy proclaiming a general blockade of the British Isles at a time when the naval force of that enemy dared not issue from his own ports. She was reminded without effect that her own prior blockades, unsupported by an adequate naval force actually applied and continued, were a bar to this plea; that executed edicts against millions of our property could not be retaliation on edicts confessedly impossible to be executed; that retaliation, to be just, should fall on the party setting the guilty example, not on an innocent party which was not even chargeable with an acquiescence in it.

When deprived of this flimsy veil for a prohibition of our trade with her enemy by the repeal of his prohibition of our trade with Great Britain, her cabinet, instead of a corresponding repeal or a practical discontinuance of its orders, formally avowed a determination to persist in them against the United States until the markets of her enemy should be laid open to British products, thus asserting an obligation on a neutral power to require one belligerent to encourage by its internal regulations the trade of another belligerent, contradicting her own practice toward all nations, in peace as well as in war, and betraying the insincerity of those professions which inculcated a belief that, having resorted to her orders with regret, she was anxious to find an occasion for putting an end to them.

Abandoning still more all respect for the neutral rights of the United States and for its own consistency, the British Government now demands as prerequisites to a repeal of its orders as they relate to the United States that a formality should be observed in the repeal of the French decrees nowise necessary to their termination nor exemplified by British usage, and that the French repeal, besides including that portion of the decrees which operates within a territorial jurisdiction, as well as that which operates on the high seas, against the commerce of the United States should not be a single and special repeal in relation to the United States, but should be extended to whatever other neutral nations unconnected with them may be affected by those decrees. And as an additional insult, they are called on for a formal disavowal of conditions and pretensions advanced by the French Government for which the United States are so far from having made themselves responsible that, in official explanations which have been published to the world, and in a correspondence of the American minister at London with the British minister for foreign affairs such a responsibility was explicitly and emphatically disclaimed.

It has become, indeed, sufficiently certain that the commerce of the United States is to be sacrificed, not as interfering with the belligerent rights of Great Britain; not as supplying the wants of her enemies, which she herself supplies; but as interfering with the monopoly which she covets for her own commerce and navigation. She carries on a war against the lawful commerce of a friend that she may the better carry on a commerce with an enemy — a commerce polluted by the forgeries and perjuries which are for the most part the only passports by which it can succeed.

Anxious to make every experiment short of the last resort of injured nations, the United States have withheld from Great Britain, under successive modifications, the benefits of a free intercourse with their market, the loss of which could not but outweigh the profits accruing from her restrictions of our commerce with other nations. And to entitle these experiments to the more favorable consideration they were so framed as to enable her to place her adversary under the exclusive operation of them. To these appeals her Government has been equally inflexible, as if willing to make sacrifices of every sort rather than yield to the claims of justice or renounce the errors of a false pride. Nay, so far were the attempts carried to overcome the attachment of the British cabinet to its unjust edicts that it received every encouragement within the competency of the executive branch of our Government to expect that a repeal of them would be followed by a war between the United States and France, unless the French edicts should also be repealed. Even this communication, although silencing forever the plea of a disposition in the United States to acquiesce in those edicts originally the sole plea for them, received no attention.

If no other proof existed of a predetermination of the British Government against a repeal of its orders, it might be found in the correspondence of the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at London and the British secretary for foreign affairs in 1810, on the question whether the blockade of May, 1806, was considered as in force or as not in force. It had been ascertained that the French Government, which urged this blockade as the ground of its Berlin decree, was willing in the event of its removal, to repeal that decree, which, being followed by alternate repeals of the other offensive edicts, might abolish the whole system on both sides. This inviting opportunity for accomplishing an object so important to the United States, and professed so often to be the desire of both the belligerents, was made known to the British Government. As that Government admits that an actual application of an adequate force is necessary to the existence of a legal blockade, and it was notorious that if such a force had ever been applied its long discontinuance had annulled the blockade in question, there could be no sufficient objection on the part of Great Britain to a formal revocation of it, and no imaginable objection to a declaration of the fact that the blockade did not exist. The declaration would have been consistent with her avowed principles of blockade, and would have enabled the United States to demand from France the pledged repeal of her decrees, either with success, in which case the way would have been opened for a general repeal of the belligerent edicts, or without success, in which case the United States would have been justified in turning their measures exclusively against France. The British Government would, however, neither rescind the blockade nor declare its nonexistence, nor permit its non-existence to be inferred and affirmed by the American plenipotentiary. On the contrary, by representing the blockade to be comprehended in the orders in council, the United States were compelled so to regard it in their subsequent proceedings.

There was a period when a favorable change in the policy of the British cabinet was justly considered as established. The minister plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty here proposed an adjustment of the differences more immediately endangering the harmony of the two countries. The proposition was accepted with the promptitude and cordiality corresponding with the invariable professions of this Government. A foundation appeared to be laid for a sincere and lasting reconciliation. The prospect, however, quickly vanished. The whole proceeding was disavowed by the British Government without any explanations which could at that time repress the belief that the disavowal proceeded from a spirit of hostility to the commercial rights and prosperity of the United States; and it has since come into proof that at the very moment when the public minister was holding the language of friendship and inspiring confidence in the sincerity of the negotiation with which he was charged a secret agent of his Government was employed in intrigues having for their object a subversion of our Government and a dismemberment of our happy union.

In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain toward the United States our attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers — a warfare which is known to spare neither age nor sex and to be distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity. It is difficult to account for the activity and combinations which have for some time been developing themselves among tribes in constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons without connecting their hostility with that influence and without recollecting the authenticated examples of such interpositions heretofore furnished by the officers and agents of that Government.

Such is the spectacle of injuries and indignities which have been heaped on our country, and such the crisis which its unexampled forbearance and conciliatory efforts have not been able to avert. It might at least have been expected that an enlightened nation, if less urged by moral obligations or invited by friendly dispositions on the part of the United States, would have found its true interest alone a sufficient motive to respect their rights and their tranquillity on the high seas; that an enlarged policy would have favored that free and general circulation of commerce in which the British nation is at all times interested, and which in times of war is the best alleviation of its calamities to herself as well as to other belligerents; and more especially that the British cabinet would not, for the sake of a precarious and surreptitious intercourse with hostile markets, have persevered in a course of measures which necessarily put at hazard the invaluable market of a great and growing country, disposed to cultivate the mutual advantages of an active commerce.

Other counsels have prevailed. Our moderation and conciliation have had no other effect than to encourage perseverance and to enlarge pretensions. We behold our seafaring citizens still the daily victims of lawless violence, committed on the great common and highway of nations, even within sight of the country which owes them protection. We behold our vessels, freighted with the products of our soil and industry, or returning with the honest proceeds of them, wrested from their lawful destinations, confiscated by prize courts no longer the organs of public law but the instruments of arbitrary edicts, and their unfortunate crews dispersed and lost, or forced or inveigled in British ports into British fleets, whilst arguments are employed in support of these aggressions which have no foundation but in a principle equally supporting a claim to regulate our external commerce in all cases whatsoever.

We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a state of war against the United States, and on the side of the United States a state of peace toward Great Britain.

Whether the United States shall continue passive under these progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of their national rights, shall commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of Events, avoiding all connections which might entangle it in the contest or views of other powers, and preserving a constant readiness to concur in an honorable re-establishment of peace and friendship, is a solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the Government. In recommending it to their early deliberations I am happy in the assurance that the decision will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic councils of a virtuous, a free, and a powerful nation.

Having presented this view of the relations of the United States with Great Britain and of the solemn alternative grow mg out of them, I proceed to remark that the communica tions last made to Congress on the subject of our relations with France will have shewn that since the revocation of her decrees, as they violated the neutral rights of the United States, her Government has authorized illegal captures by its privateers and public ships, and that other outrages have been practised on our vessels and our citizens It will have been seen also that no indemnity had been provided or satisfacto rily pledged for the extensive spoliations committed under the violent and retrospective orders of the French Government against the property of our citizens seized within the jurisdic tion of France I abstain at this time from recommending to the consideration of Congress definitive measures with respect to that nation, in the expectation that the result of unclosed discussions between our minister plenipotentiary at Paris and the French Government will speedily enable Congress to decide with greater advantage on the course due to the rights, the interests, and the honor of our country.

14 Responses to June 17, 1812: Congress Declares War on Great Britain

  • It is worth recalling that International Maritime Law on belligerent and neutral rights was very far from settled, until the Paris Declaration of 1856. Any country could find support for its own position in the writings of some eminent Publicist. And, of course, systems of international arbitration only started to be be developed after the Alabama incident (again involving the US and UK), which went to arbitration in Geneva in 1871-1872.

    Even in the two World Wars, the concept of “contraband of war” tended to be an elastic one, with the US arguing for a narrow definition, whilst it was neutral and an expansive one, when it was not.

  • In 1812 the mightiest (in the military sense) empire in the world was that of Napoleon Bonaparte, and in the midst of the struggle to overcome it Britain was not best pleased to have to divert scarce military and naval resources to a sideshow which couldn’t be ignored since the US was in the process of invading Canada. The War of 1812 is now hardly remembered in England, but its baleful legacy poisoned Anglo-US relations for much of the nineteenth century.

  • “In 1812 the mightiest (in the military sense) empire in the world was that of Napoleon Bonaparte, and in the midst of the struggle to overcome it Britain was not best pleased to have to divert scarce military and naval resources to a sideshow which couldn’t be ignored since the US was in the process of invading Canada.”

    As the outcome of the Napoleonic Wars indicates John, I stand by my contention that Britain was the mightiest empire in the world. Napoleon dominated Europe while Great Britain dominated the globe. The resources that Great Britain allocated to the War of 1812 were fairly insignificant in comparison to the resources devoted to the War in Spain and Portugal and keeping the fleets manned to blockade Europe. Although I think that declaring war on Great Britain was unwise, I think it entirely justified due to the short-sighted policy of Great Britain in stopping American ships to search for alleged deserters from the Royal Navy and stirring up trouble for the US among the tribes in the Northwest. With Britain involved in a life and death struggle against Napoleon, one would have assumed that the wisest British policy would have been one of conciliation of American grievances. Such was not the case, until far too late.

  • Don’t know much about History.

    Today, I read a WSJ article on the Canadian exhibit concerning this crappy, little war (35,000 Americans died: big butcher’s bill, small country).

    It seems there were four parties in the war. Americans, Brits, Canadians, and Injuns. Of the four, the only clear losers were the Injuns. The murderous savages picked the wrong side, as had four of the five, terrorist Iroquois tribes during the Revolutionary War.

    Re: Canada all they had to do was hold Quebec keeping the St. Lawrence R. supply line open and they held Canada. The US never got closer than Lake Erie and across from Detroit. So, Saxon murderers coming here and burning DC and invading Louisiana were utterly uncalled for. Then, Andy Jackson gave the Injuns and the Saxon “what-for” in 1814.

  • What Andrew Jackson did was abuse his power to turn American presidancy into might makes right by kicking civilized Indians out of southern towns to the western wilderness and I say “civilized Indians” because they were Indians who converted from barbarism, this happened because Andrew represented the poor uneducated people of the south, was not from the East coast and told congress to buzz off because they did not have control of the army.

  • @T Shaw

    Far from being ‘uncalled-for’, the burning of Washington was in retaliation for the American burning of York (Toronto) in the previous year. The war was (and is) perceived in Canada as a victory, and although the consensus has long been that it was a draw, in reality it was a British victory in that American aggression did not pay off. The Ghent treaty restored the status quo ante bellum, and the American victories merely ensured that the terms were not more punitive.

    To their credit, the British refused to repatriate the thousands of slaves who had sought refuge in British territory, although they were willing to compensate the owners.

  • Valentin,

    Additionally, Jackson was the democrat proto-demagogue who pitted whole classes of Americans against others. See his veto message for the Second Bank of the US Act and Daniel Webster’s analysis. Seems that class hate is in locked in the Democrat Party DNA.

    JN: As I said, the only true losers were the Injuns. I do not see how can you compare York, ON to the White House. That’s me.

    The US lost no territory. They stopped boarding US ships. The Indians were kaput as a block to western expansion and the Saxon would never again use them like al Qaeda to murder Americans. And, we got the Battle of New Orleans in our national consciousness.

    PS: Thirty-three years later the Saxon was exporting wheat out of Ireland while a quarter of the population starved. Concomitantly, the worst tyrant on Earth: Czar of Russia closed the ports of Poland and fed those people suffering in the same potato blight.

    The Brits came close to fighting for the Confederacy in the ACW. They also used slaves to fight against freedom in the Revolutionary War. Some things never change.

    By 1865, the US could have taken Canada and any other place it wanted in the Americas.

    PPS: The US went in on the wrong side in 1917.

  • “The US went in on the wrong side in 1917″

    You had me cheering until that last part TShaw.

  • Yeah, that was a little “over the top.”

  • TS, what’s this crap about Saxons? The population of the USA, Canada and the UK in 1917 were of the same racial stock, namely English, Irish and Scots (except for the Indians, who were merely an obstacle to US colonialism). Let’s face it, when it comes to treatment of the indigenous population, the Spanish were more enlightened in the 16th century than you lot were in the 19th.

    In retrospect, you should have stayed neutral in 1917. It was over a year before the Americans could field a single division (compared to the more than 20 the Brits managed in the first year of the war) and despite the individual qualities of the American soldier, he was let down, particularly in the Argonne offensive, by poor staff work. By this stage the war was virtually won. Still, Woodrow Wilson got what he wanted, a chance to influence the Peace Conference with his naive egomania.

  • Sorry, first sentence should have said 1812, not 1917!

  • JN: Probably the word “sassenach’ is a better descriptive than “Saxon.”

    Lo, we treated the noble savage no worse that you did the Mere Irish in 1847. I am 165 years old. I was there with Covington and Custer. I take full responsibility. Then, it was duty. Next time it will be strictly personal.

    I was about inform you that the largest US immigrant group was Germans.

    Empires are better suited to fight world wars than are republics.

    I bet I dislike Wilson far more than you. We still suffer from his wreckovations.

    I understand Mexican school text books depict the Alamo as a glorious victory, while US history presents a massacre that inspired ultimate victory.

    Finally, it is human nature to fear and loathe those whom we have harmed.

    Cheerio!

  • TS
    You can win spectacular victories and still lose the war. Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt … or to give a more recent example, the overwhelming defeat of the Tet offensive by US and ARVN forces in 1968.

    “Empires are better suited to fight world wars than republics”. That explains the victory of the Japanese Empire over the US Republic in 1945! There are contiguous land empires which are republics eg the USSR, and maritime empires like the French with a republic at the centre.

    “The largest US immigrant group was Germans” This explains why spoken American English doesn’t recognize the adverb. “Ich habe gut geschlafen” is correct German, whereas “I slept good” is incorrect English. I assume Italian immigrants introduced the double negative – “non so niente” being incorrectly rendered as “I don’t know nothing”. Still, the latest wave of Hispanic immigrants shouldn’t affect the language as they’re no longer required to learn it.

    Do read what modern Irish historians have to say about their country’s past, including the Famine, rather than buying into the mythological version.

    Toodle pip!

  • JN,

    Thanks for the history lessons.

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